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SELF-ASSESSED VALUATION SYSTEMS
FOR TORT AND OTHER LAW*
Saul Levmore**

T

HE purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that self-assessment is a valuable, if underused, 1 tool for overcoming valuation problems in a wide variety of legal areas. Self-assessment
builds on the notion that the individual who is most familiar with
a property right is also likely to be the party best able to put a
monetary value on that interest. Valuations by judges, tax assessors, appraisers, and juries generate substantial transacting costs,
including court, administrative and insurance costs, inaccuracies,
and risks of corrupt practices. Self-assessment systems seek to
eliminate these disadvantages of our institutional assessment
systems.
Theoretically, the applicability of self-assessment is almost endless.2 However applied, it raises interesting and time-honored questions about valuation techniques, individual tastes, market prices,
and strategic behavior. This essay, however, aims to provide a perspective that is quite practical; it will describe the strong and weak
points of self-assessment in three specific areas: property tax assessment, tort damage determination, and corporate stock valuation. The contrast of these different subjects is intended to demonstrate the flexibility of self-assessment in solving the problem of
accurate valuation that is common to many areas of law. Self-assessment is by no means a uniformly satisfactory solution to this
common hurdle of accurate valuation. Rather, it is important to
* The author is grateful for the helpful suggestions of Jeffrey O'Connell, Harvey Pernman,
Glen Robinson, George Rutherglen, Robert E. Scott, and Nicholas Tideman.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., Columbia,
1973; Ph.D., 1978, J.D., 1980, Yale.
I Actually, self-assessment is used in a number of contexts, although it may not be
recognized as such. For example, "claiming races," which are used to equalize competition in
horse racing, can be interpreted as part of a sophisticated self-assessment system. See infra
note 214.

s There are some areas of law in which parties appear able to self-assess-in that they can
specify values in advance-but fall to do so. For example, only some contracts specify the
damages that must be paid in the event of a breach. Arguably, such specifications would be
more common if the parties were forced to bear the full cost of any litigation they engaged
in, including, for example, the cost of judicial salaries.
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explore the mechanics of self-assessment in order to identify the
environments in which it is most workable and least objectionable.
One specific claim of this article is that the principle of self-assessment ought to be utilized at least in the determination of tort
damages. Such a system would save a tremendous amount of court
time currently devoted to valuations that are speculative and often
grossly inaccurate.
Part I of this article introduces some of the details of self-assessment by examining the concept of a self-assessed property tax. It is
appropriate to begin with the property tax because it is in this area
that the idea of self-assessment has already received some attention in the literature. This adventure over partially charted terrain
sets the stage for an expanded discussion of the self-assessment
concept in other areas. Part II discusses tort damages and proposes
a system that offers, in some ways, the advantages of no-fault systems without seriously disturbing the ability of tort law to deter
accidents in an optimal way. Finally, in discussing self-assessed securities valuation, Part III draws upon the similarities and differences between the systems described for the property tax and for
tort damages and emphasizes the recurring themes and analyses in
the various self-assessment schemes. It is difficult to determine
which of the current institutional assessment systems ought to be
replaced by self-assessment systems. It is possible to identify, however, the environmental characteristics that support self-assessment and to suggest the circumstances that favor the development
of a self-assessment system.
I.

A.

OBJECTIVELY ASSESSED PROPERTY TAXEs

The Current System of Institutional Assessment

Property taxes in the United States are generally legislated, collected, and expended locally.' In purely arithmetic terms, the
Only three states-Hawaii, Maryland, and Montana-administer property taxes at the
O
state level. In Utah, the State Tax Commission provides the personnel and the administrative vehicle for periodic reassessment. In the other states, the local tax assessor has the
primary responsibility for valuing most property. In many states, however, public utilities

are assessed at the state level and the tax revenues generated are prorated among local
jurisdictions. Council of State Gov'ts, The Property Tax: A Primer 5 (1978).
Property taxation is so localized that there are more than 82,000 governmental units that
levy such a tax. Competition among these units for desirable residents and businesses-mitigated to some extent by the need for revenues-has produced a bewildering
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property tax is a rate,4 set by elected officials, 5 that is multiplied
by the assessed value of real property in a particular jurisdiction.
This product represents a property owner's tax liability for a given
time period; the sum of these liabilities is the revenue available to
the government from this source.6 Frequently, there will be a number of different rates at any one time corresponding to various
types of property, such as commercial and residential.7 Yet it can
generally be assumed that a goal of each locale's tax system is to
make the tax burden, within each class of property, a function of
the property's value. To this end, government employees are given
the task of assigning values to the improved properties in the locale and, periodically, updating the valuations on existing build-

ings and land.8

variety of assessment practices and tax rates. See R. Worsnop, Property Tax Reform 104
(1971). This competition and what would remain of it after the institution of a self-assessment system are topics well beyond the reach of this article.
4 This tax rate is often called a "levy." It is sometimes referred to in terms of mills-perdollar. Each mill is one-tenth of a cent.
5 The tax rate is normally set by a town council or similar elected body. The tax assessor
may also be elected or appointed. For a discussion of assessor expertise and its relationship
to election or appointment, see Council of State Gov'ts, supra note 3, at 6.
It is clear that the relative burden of property taxation on similarly situated taxpayers
within a single taxing jurisdiction is determined by the practices of the assessor and not the
rate setter. However the rate is determined, there is some concern that when tax assessors
themselves are elected, they are tempted to seek political favors by deliberately discriminating in their assessements. H. Aaron, Who Pays the Property Tax? A New View 68 (1975).
1 By fiscal 1976, the property tax provided roughly 31% of all revenues available to local
governments, a 5% decrease from fiscal 1972. Apparently, the property tax as a revenue
source has declined somewhat in proportion to other sources of revenue; however, state and
local dollar collections increased by 35% over the five-year period of fiscal 1972-76. In fiscal
1976, property taxes accounted for fifty-seven billion dollars in revenues to state and local
governments. Council of State Gov'ts, supra note 3, at 1-2.
7 Jurisdictions may consciously use different assessment procedures for different classes
of property. Property tax rates for large commercial or industrial propertie' may actually be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, even when such uneven treatment is illegal. K. Case,
Property Taxation: The Need for Reform 5 (1978).
8 Especially in an inflationary period, the relative burdens of taxation are distributed
more fairly the more frequently assessments are updated. New structures are, of course,
assessed as they are completed and old structures therefore must be reassessed lest each
new property with its inflated value bear an unfair burden.
Still, there appears to be no set period of time after which assessors must update their
properties. In California, for example, until recent times, most assessors followed what has
been described as a "cyclical reappraisal policy," i.e., the assessor would concentrate his
appraisal efforts in one part of the county one year and another part the next, covering the
whole county in a period of three to six years, and then repeating the cycle. In the mid1960's, however, the assessors were urged to concentrate their efforts in areas where analyses
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The economic and social characteristics of this tax have been
widely debated.9 One such issue concerns the desirability of assessing properties at one hundred percent of value rather than at some
lower percentage. 10 So long as total revenues from the tax can be
adjusted by raising or lowering the tax rate, however, it is the relative assessment among taxpayers that is critical.1"
A less debated but far more crucial issue concerns the elusive
nature of the property tax base and the meaning of "value." Even
,if it is agreed that value refers to market value, 2 it is not easy to
agree on the nature or characteristics of market value, especially in
the absence of an extremely active and dampened s market for homogeneous goods.1 4 Nor are there lessons to be learned from the
of ratios of assessed values to sales prices of individual properties produced large coefficients of dispersion or average ratios that varied widely from the county-wide average.
Welch, Property Taxation: Policy Potentials and Probabilities, in The Property Tax and Its
Administration 209 (A. Lynn. Jr. ed. 1969).
A study of property assessments over a ten-year period in Boston concluded that, absent
intervening sales, virtually no values had been updated; even when sales had occurred in the
intervening period, reassessments were rare. A small sample was traced back over a 24-year
period during which there had been no changes in assessments. K. Case, supra note 7, at 3435. It has been suggested that city officials feel pressured not to reassess owner-occupied
homes because such reassessments might be blamed for forcing home owners out of the city.
Moreover, to the extent that assessors operate under a budget constraint, their first priorities are to assess new construction and then to reassess high-value, income-producing
properties. D. Paul, The Politics of the Property Tax 27 (1975).
9 See, e.g., K. Case, supra note 7; D. Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax (1966); D.
Paul, supra note 8; Property Tax Reform (G. Peterson ed. 1973).
10 For an argument that full assessment at 100% of value would provide useful information to a variety of users, see Aaron, Some Observations on Property Tax Valuation and the
Significance of Full Value Assessment, in The Property Tax and Its Administration, supra
note 8, at 157.
11See generally, R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 477
(3d ed. 1980).
12 For the most part, economists define the value of a good as its power in exchange, and
this definition, otherwise known as the market value rule, has been utilized in most property
tax statutes.
23 A dampened market is one without significant fluctuations.
14 If a property recently has been sold, an assessor can use the sale price to accomplish his
task. If not, the assessor can use any of three traditional approaches: the comparable sales,
cost, and income approaches. The comparable sales approach looks to recent sales of other
properties and adjusts for features that differentiate the sold properties from the assessed
property. The cost approach assesses the value of the underlying land, which within an area
varies less per unit than do structures, adds the reproduction costs of the structures on the
land, and subtracts depreciation. Finally, the income approach estimates the net rental income that can be earned by a property and capitalizes this amount to arrive at the current
market value of the property. See International Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Property Assess-

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 774 1982

19821

Self-Assessed Valuation

relatively efficient administration of other taxes. The income tax,
for example, deals with a flow variable; because the income received by one wage earner or landlord in a given year is generally
denominated in the same units as that received by another wage
earner or landlord, both incomes are directly comparable.
This ambiguity of market value, when used in a context other
than one that refers to the subjective valuations that accompany
actual trades, is the source of a very practical problem in the world
of tax assessment. 15 In considering whether to offer incentives to
assessors who perform well or in ascertaining whether institutional
assessment by a local tax assessor is a success, it is necessary first
to identify a perfect assessment. If market value, or some fraction
thereof, is the assessor's aim, this market value could be determined ex post in order to evaluate the assessor's performance. But
even this is a hopeless task. Consider, for example, the assessor
who knows that A is willing to buy B's home for $100,000. A has no
reason to think that B is interested in selling and moving and A
makes no offer. The assessor, figuring that there may well be someone who likes the house more than A does or that A, in the heat of
negotiating, would finally offer $105,000, dutifully assesses the
house for property tax purposes at $105,000 or an appropriate frac-

ment Valuation (1977).
These three approaches are strikingly similar to the valuation techniques for assessing
corporate shares or business interests, and are subject to the same criticisms. The "Delaware
block approach," for example, calls for the determination of market value, earnings value,
and net asset value of stock, followed by the assignment of a percentage weight to each of
these determinants. See generally W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 117-36 (5th ed. 1980); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1453, 1456-71 (1966). Put simply, unless there is an active market for
uniform goods, it is no small task to predict the price that would be reached in an exchange.
" The ambiguities of the terms "market value" and "good assessment" are exacerbated
by the fact that sellers and buyers are individuals and often do not behave alike. One person
might not wait as long as another for the ideal offer. As Professor Groves has said:
[T]his does not mean, that if the assessor places a $10,000 figure on a house and the
house is sold next week for $15,000, then the assessor has undervalued this house by
one-third. Sales determine value but a particular sale is not conclusive and might be
badly off target. Exchanges are made by fools like you and me; why should we assume
that the exchangers are better judges of the market than the assessor? Of course, an
estimate backed by cash is entitled to respect in terms of sincerity, but it is likely to
be amateurish compared with the assessor's figure.
Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually and Practically Administrable?, in The Property
Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 16. See also F. Bird, The General Property
Tax: Findings of the 1957 Census of Governments 26-37 (1960).
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tion thereof. Sometime later, B decides to sell the property and
offers it to C for $95,000. C accepts. What is the market value of
the house?""
So long as there are transacting costs in matching buyers and
sellers and in showing houses, many owners will expect to sell their
properties at some price less than that which some buyer would
willingly pay. The point is that there is no objective market value
for a property that is traded infrequently. It has been suggested
that market value could well be defined as the price that some
willing buyer would offer measured on an average of once every
three months, or some other arbitrary interval of time.17 Even with
this definition, however, it is impossible to evaluate an assessor's
performance with regard to a specific property; to do so, one would
need not only a fair sample of property sales but also a sophisticated study to weigh the sales that took place before and after the
arbitrarily selected length of time.
An easier way to judge an assessor's performance begins by recognizing that it is not market value that is important. Rather, the
relative assessments of taxpayers and how those assessments correspond to relative sales prices are important. In other words, an
assessor who correctly assesses D's home at three times the value
of E's has done a good job if that ratio proves true upon sale,1 8
even though the assessor may have been far off in predicting the
absolute values of the properties. 9 Once again, so long as the prop18 This example really reviews the earlier objection to the market value ideal. To measure

an assessor's work against actual market transactions may be to use an inappropriate

standard.
17 N. Tideman, Three Approaches to Improving Urban Land Use 55 (1969) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation submitted to the Economics Department of the University of Chicago).
18 Again, the ideal of "market value" is accepted, despite its possible inferiority. See
supra note 16.
,' Most jurisdictions assess value at something less than 100% of market value, the most
common figure lying somewhere between 25% and 50%. This assessment ratio can be instrumental in avoiding complaints and corrections if the property owner is unaware of the
assessment ratio in his jurisdiction. The owner may be quite pleased with an assessment
that is, for example, 30% of his own assessment of the market value. He may think that the
assessor has erred in his favor, whereas 25% may be the real assessment ratio. Council of
State Gov'ts, supra note 3, at 4-5. Apparently, state tax administrators have been unable to
hold local assessors to the use of any uniform percentage of full market value. The actual
system is characterized by an extralegal system of classification that is developed by the
individual assessor. Shannon, The Property Tax: Reform or Relief?., in Property Tax Reform, supra note 9, at 29.
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erty tax rate can be varied, it is the relative burden on taxpayers
that really matters. Studies of the horizontal equity of the property tax therefore have concentrated on inequalities in assessments
relative to property values. The better the assessors perform their
task within a jurisdiction, the less dispersion there will be in the
ratios of assessment values to sales values. 2 0 The available studies
indicate that for the simplest class of non-farm houses only a small
percentage of the areas studied kept this dispersion within fifteen
percent of the median assessment ratio.2 1 This is far more than the
22
margin of error on income tax returns of comparable simplicity.
The difficulty of assessing value may not explain completely the
observed inconsistency of property tax assessments. Recent studies
call the property tax assessment system "certainly among the most
corrupt of urban functions." 3 One commentator explained that
"the actual work of valuing property is done by 'street level bureaucrats' over whom there is generally little effective supervision"
and that assessing "is both discretionary and subjective, combining
24
constant temptation with minimal likelihood of exposure.
20 The "assessment-sales price ratio" refers to the quotient that results from dividing the
sum of assessed values for sold properties by the sum of their sales prices. The properties
that are actually sold are assumed to be a randomly generated subset of all assessed properties. Thus, if the ratio is three-tenths, assessors are, on average, assessing all properties in
the jurisdiction at 30% of market value.
As a simple example, if in one locale ten homes are assessed at $50,000 each and in the
following year three of these are sold for $100,000 each, then the median assessment ratio
would be one-half and the dispersion zero. The relative assessments, in retrospect, appear to
be perfect.
The "coefficient of dispersion" for a given area is the proportion that the average of the
deviations of the assessment ratios of individually sold properties from their median ratio
bears to their median ratio. This coefficient, which is usually expressed as a percentage, is
considered to be an index of assessment inequality in that it measures the extent to which
the relative tax burden is unrelated to relative property values. If the assessor does a flawless job and each property that is sold sells for its assessed value or a constant multiple
thereof, the deviation will be zero and the coefficient of dispersion also zero. If the coefficient is 20%, each tax bill will be, on average, 20% more or less than it should be. See
International Ass'n of Assessing Officers, supra note 14, at 287-88; D. Netzer, supra note 9,
at 179.
f1 In 1966, only 28% of the areas studied had dispersion ratios of 15% or less. The figures
for 1971 and 1976 were 25% and 22% respectively. Only a very small percentage of areas
(7.6 in 1966, 6.7 in 1971, and 6.9 in 1976) assessed well enough for the coefficient of dispersion to be less than 10 percent. Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Governments, Taxable Property Values and Assessment/Sales Price Ratios at 21, Table N.
22 D. Netzer, supra note 9, at 179.
2 D. Paul, supra note 8, at 7.
24 Id. at 8. Some critics argue that poor assessment performance may be the result of
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B. A Simple Self-Assessment System
A self-assessed property tax system 25 can be thought of as one
that seeks to improve the accuracy and lessen the expense of subjective, institutional assessments by avoiding the futile quest for an
elusive market value and relying, instead, on the owner's internal
value or reservation price. 26 In asking an owner to volunteer information about what his property is worth to him, we face an obvious problem that is at the core of any self-assessment system: unless constrained, an owner will underassess or, more accurately,
selfishly announce a dishonest assessment. Only if this problem
can be solved in a given setting is self-assessment suitable to that

conscious discrimination as opposed to incompetence. These critics point out that large cities have professional assessment departments with modern tools and yet still have not done
an adequate job of valuation. D. Netzer, supra note 9, at 183. The problem of achieving
acceptably accurate institutional assessments may be simply intractable, however, and those
attaining low coefficients of dispersion merely "lucky" in having achieved the "correct"
result.
25 For other thoughts and descriptions in this area, see N. Tideman, supra note 17, at 5269; Harberger, Issues of Tax Reform for Latin America, in Fiscal Policy for Economic
Growth in Latin America 110 (1965); Holland & Vaughn, An Evaluation of Self-Assessment
Under a Property Tax, in The Property Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 79.
Apparently, self-assessment, in some form, has already been attempted in Wisconsin and
Australia. Professor Groves notes that:
It comes as something of a shock to learn that the local assessor in the early days of
Wisconsin was not an appraiser at all; he was a "collector of lists and administrator of
oaths." Property owners were supposed to self-assess their property and take a solemn oath to the list .... In the late 1860's it was largely abandoned in favor of the
assessor's own count and appraisal. Along with self-listing went drastic penalties for
dishonest reporting. The experience should have established two principles of tax administration: unless reinforced by other evidence, self-reporting will not provide a fair
and adequate tax base; threat of drastic penalty of and by itself will not help very
much.
Groves, Is the Property Tax Conceptually and Practically Administrable?, in The Property
Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 23-24.
Australia's system called upon the state to purchase the property if it detected an underassessing taxpayer, but this system failed because courts would not permit the state to
"purchase" property below market value. See Woodruff, Strengths and Weaknesses of the
Property Tax, in Property Tax Reform, The Role of the Property Tax In the Nation's Revenue System 120-21 (1972). The simple system of self-assessment that is described in the
following pages of this article could also be attacked based on the constitutional requirement of "just compensation." Because the more sophisticated system of "competitive assessment" that is later developed in the text does not require any property owner to sell his
property, however, the constitutionality of this simpler system with its "forced sales" is not
discussed.
26 These latter two terms refer to the amount of money a property owner would require to
be indifferent between a sale and keeping his property.
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environment.
In the context of property tax assessment, the tendency toward
underassessment might be countered by a system of penalties or
rewards similar to those that are used to encourage correct reporting in our income tax system. This strategy, however, would substantially increase administrative costs, an especially unattractive
option for small governmental units. More important, unless those
property owners who do not sell their property in the foreseeable
future are to be virtually exempt from the penalties for underassessment, this system will call for audits of unsold properties that
will require the same subjective, institutional assessments of market value that we seek to avoid.2
Simple self-assessment instead relies on market penalties rather
than institutional ones, and thus avoids entirely the need for fallible or corruptible government assessors and auditors. A simple
self-assessment system might require each property owner to file a
self-assessed valuation of his property. The institutionally determined tax rate is applied to this self-assessed amount to determine
the yearly tax liability. Periodically-perhaps every other year in
staggered fashion around a locale-the self-assessed amounts are
publicized and any buyer who is willing to pay that amount to the
owner/self-assessor is entitled to the property. An owner may always change his self-assessed amount up to the time of publication, but then the new amount represents the tax base for the next
year. The system could also provide for property inspections, in
order to remove any temptation to allow the exteriors of properties
to deteriorate as a means of discouraging buyers.2 8 The owner
could collect a fixed fee for each inspection to compensate him for
any inconvenience6 and to discourage hobbyists. 29 In short, the system uses forced sales, in lieu of audits and fines, as a way of encouraging accurate self-assessment.3
17

See infra text accompanying note 42.

29 It is interesting to note that in some European cities the use of objectively measurable

exterior features as part of institutional assessments encouraged homebuilders to respond
with virtually windowless residences.
29 Professor Tideman suggests that this fee will be a standard percentage of the assessed
value. See N. Tideman, supra note 17, at 59.
30 A system that allows any bidder to force a sale is far superior to one that allows only

the government to be a forcing buyer. The government has insufficient resources to maintain a credible threat. Owners will know that they can underassess, especially when the
government's budgetary woes are well known. Of course, a self-assessment system could re-
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One objection to this system is that forced sellers ought to be
compensated for their moving costs. A more sophisticated version
of this objection would argue that the "forcing buyer" will not take
the seller's moving costs into consideration and, therefore, there
will be an inefficiently large number of ownership changes. Yet
nothing stops sellers from taking into account the costs and disadvantages of moving when filing their self-assessments. Buyers, of
course, face similar costs. On the other hand, some people dislike
moving more than others and some, such as book collectors, have
relatively high real moving costs. Thus, although it is true that
self-assessors can account for these things, it may be objectionable
for these differences among people to yield unequal tax burdens.
This objection to the tax base itself, while small in magnitude in
this illustration, will be discussed shortly in a more general application.-1 For the present, it is sufficient to note that the self-assessor can protect himself by announcing a value that reflects the
amount of money he would need to feel compensated for a forced
move. 3 2 Alternatively, the system could make this process more explicit-but no more or less effective in dealing with book collectors-by requiring the forcing buyer to offer a fixed percentage
above the self-assessed amount.3 3 Presumably, relative self-assessments will remain unchanged between these two alternatives, but
the latter system will yield lower absolute self-assessments and
higher tax rates.
A more pervasive objection to the self-assessed property tax is
the heavier tax burden that falls on owners with idiosyncratic
tastes. Most citizens, for example, might be willing to buy a particular home for $50,000. The owner, F, however, may have planted
trees and installed bookshelves that he adores. He would require
$100,000 to be pleased with a sale. If there is even one buyer who
shares some or all of F's tastes, then F will have to self-assess at

quire ordinary bidders or forcing buyers to post bonds that would guarantee their ability to
buy the property in question.
31 See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
32 The possibility of "assessment insurance" is also relevant. In the event that a "forcing
buyer" acquired the property-despite an assessment suggested or agreed upon by the insurer-the insurer would pay an agreed-upon sum to the insured or be required to purchase
the property from the successful bidder and return it to the insured, the original owner.
33 One commentator suggested that this premium be fixed at 20%. Harberger, supra note
25, at 119.
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$100,000 to forestall a forced sale. This is so despite the fact that
"most people" would consider $50,000 to be the reasonable value
of F's home. On the other hand, in an idealized sense, $100,000
may be closer to market value in that the market, like fearful selfassessors, deals in marginal and not average transactions."
Although the next section of this article describes an assessment
system that gives some relief to the idiosyncratic owner while retaining the advantages of self-assessment, it is important to realize
that the heavier burden on idiosyncratic taxpayers is not necessarily wrong or inefficient. In the first place, most of these idiosyncracies imply greater happiness or utility on the part of the owner.
If, for example, there is only one cul-de-sac in an area and an owner, whose home is on the cul-de-sac, greatly appreciates the absence of through traffic, he may well fear a forced sale and "overassess" his property. Yet, this owner's assessment reflects his good
fortune in living on a cul-de-sac; good fortune, insofar as it can be
determined, is arguably the ideal tax base in any system that seeks
to take more from those who have more.3 5 In practice, most idioU For a brief discussion of the distinction between marginal and inframarginal or average
purchasers, and the relationship of these concepts to consumer surplus, see infra note 195.
Consumer and producer surpluses are considered at infra note 35.
'a The question of whether to include idiosyncratic tastes in the tax base is related to the
concepts of "consumer surplus" and "producer surplus," and whether these surpluses ought
to be taxed when measurable. Imagine a society in which ten workers would do a task for
five dollars per hour, and another ten workers would do this task for six dollars per hour
(perhaps they value their leisure time more), and a final group of ten workers that could be
hired at a wage of seven dollars per hour. The employer calculates his profit levels for the
various combinations and decides to hire seventeen workers at six dollars per hour. The
employer knows that he must pay all the workers the same wage, because he has no way to
differentiate among them. In addition, morale would suffer if two wages were paid for the
same task. Could not the tax system legitimately tax the first group of ten workers more
than it does the next seven? Given that they would have worked for five dollars per hour,
they are, after all, "happier" than some of their fellow workers who are receiving not a
penny more than their "reservation wages." This one dollar difference between the market
wage and the wage at which they would have first agreed to work is their "producer
surplus."
Similarly, suppose that A and B both buy stock in the same corporation for $10 per share
and later sell their shares for $40 apiece. Each will be taxed on a $30 gain. Yet what if we
knew that A would have bought the stock for $50 per share, given his expectations at the
time of purchase? This would give him a $40 "consumer surplus" per share on the shares he
actually purchased at $10. Our tax system rarely tries to tax these surpluses or idiosyncracies and, instead, treats all taxpayers as if they were marginal buyers and sellers. The tax
system must function in this fashion because we can judge neither the amount of such surpluses nor the magnitude of idiosyncratic tastes. This is not to say, however, that it would
be wrong or inefficient to tax these surpluses.
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syncratic owners will live a little dangerously and self-assess at an
amount that is greater than their perceptions of non-idiosyncratic
valuations but less than their true internal valuations. At least two
factors will determine the willingness of idiosyncratic owners to
live dangerously. First, as tax rates increase, self-assessment will
decline relative to internal valuation. Second, as the perceived
probability grows that someone shares the owner's tastes in full or
in part and will expend the effort to investigate the property, including its announced assessment, self-assessment will increase relative to internal valuation."6 Thus, while the owner with unique
tastes is taxed more heavily in this self-assessed system than under
institutional assessment, it is likely that he is still not taxed completely on his "happiness," or real internal valuation.
Because of the demonstrated relationship between self-assessed
amounts and the perceived likelihood of a forcing buyer, it follows
that self-assessment can be affected by threats and strategic behavior.37 It is not quite true, for example, that when self-assessing,
the idiosyncratic owner will only consider the probability of a forcing buyer with moderately idiosyncratic tastes. He must also consider the chance that someone will come along and threaten to buy
the property at a price greater than the non-idiosyncratic valuation
level and yet less than the true internal value to the idiosyncratic
owner. This threat may be sufficiently credible to elicit a side payment from the owner. That is, the owner may prefer occasional
side payments to higher property taxes.3 8
To the extent that these threats encourage self-assessors to announce a value closer to the true internal value of the property, the
potential threat can be said to accomplish a societal good-so long
as we favor including idiosyncratic happiness in the property tax
base. Otherwise, such strategic behavior may transfer wealth from

The self-assessment system discussed in the text is a rare example of a system that is able
to go a long way toward measuring and taxing the internal valuations of a taxpayer that
exceed the market value. It is much more sophisticated than our income tax system and,
therefore, vulnerable to different objections. Much of the textual discussion from this point
on is aimed at preserving the advantages of self-assessment without requiring the taxation
of idiosyncratic tastes.
so For a formalized elaboration of this self-assessment strategy, see N. Tideman, supra
note 17, at 61-67.
37 The latter term refers to activity that will benefit an actor by way of affecting the
behavior of a competitor.
oo Essentially, the briber and owner collude at the expense of the government's coffers.
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the risk-averse owner with either unique tastes or special knowledge to the skilled extortionist. Efforts expended in the quest for
such side payments would be socially unproductive. Although the
opportunities for strategic behavior deserve attention, similar opportunities in other areas, such as the income tax, appear to be
rarely exploited.39
One minor drawback to self-assessment is that changes in the
general price level will require self-assessors to reassess their
properties continually in order to stay one step ahead of the forcing buyer. The system could and should automatically link the
publicized taxable assessments to the price index to protect ignorant or absentee owners and reduce costs to other owners. But inflation" does not always affect internal valuations in predictable
ways or ratios. Because each self-assessor can be expected to respond to inflation in a personal way, there is no escape for owners
from the reality of costly compelled reassessments in an inflationary world.
Conventional institutional assessments may actually avoid these
costs, with no sacrifice in accuracy, so long as the assessor accounts
for inflation when bringing new properties or improvements into
the government's portfolio of taxable property. The good assessor
will deal with new properties by lowering the fraction of the total
value that is included in the assessed value, thereby equalizing the
relative assessed values of old and new property. Once the relative
burden among properties is correctly assessed, an increase in the
price level works no harm. As the government needs more revenue
it can always raise the tax rate as the assessed value becomes a
smaller fraction of market value.
C.

Competitive Assessment

Although the previous section describes a self-assessment system
that provides incentives for accurate valuation and that eliminates
the problems associated with institutional assessment, it is fair to
predict that the notion of the forced sale will disturb many readers
"9There is, for example, no evidence that informers play an important role in the administration of the income tax or that side payments are extracted by informers from their
targets.
10 The textual analysis that follows is similar-but converse-for deflationary price
changes.
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and taxpayers. 1 It is true, for example, that if H and J are enemies, H can force J to move by offering 's self-assessed amount.
Of course, J can profit from H's desire to hurt him by overassessing, but some readers will probably object to the notion that
enough money can ease any pain. In general, self-assessment will
not win many admirers if, when adopted, it generates a large number of forced sales and relocations, along with neighborhood hostility and instability.
Competitive assessment meets this objection to the simple selfassessment system by borrowing a tool from the penalties and rewards alternative rejected earlier. 4 2 A simple competitive assessment system would require that properties be opened for assessment periodically. Any number of self-appointed assessors,
including corporations, may submit their assessments of a given
property's value to the central authority. At a stated time, these
assessments, or bids, are opened. The owner of the property is then
faced with two options regarding the highest of these assessments.
First, as with simple assessment, the owner can sell his property to
the highest assessor. By submitting a bid, each assessor runs the
risk of becoming, in essence, a forced buyer. Alternatively, the
owner can retain his property and then accept the highest assessment as the taxable value of his property. The highest assessor will
then receive, as a commission from the local government, a percentage share of the increased tax revenues that will now be derived from this property. 43 These commissions will attract a group
41 Indeed, it appears that the commentators most critical of self-assessment rely, in large
part, on the guess that society will not accept the forced sale component of self-assessment,
will ostracize forcing buyers, and thereby eliminate the much needed credible threat against
underassessors. Holland & Vaughn, An Evaluation of Self-Assessment Under a Property
Tax, in The Property Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 84-87.
42 See supra text accompanying note 27.
4' The competitive assessment mechanism could be combined with the simpler self-assessment system, but this would encourage owners to underassess their property and wait
for a "bounty hunter" to come along and reassess it. If simple self-assessment is to be useful, there also must be a fine levied on a self-assessor who chooses to retain his property and
pay higher taxes when confronted with a competitive assessor. The existing literature assumes that self-assessment will be the core of the system and that such fines will be necessary. Holland & Vaughn, An Evaluation of Self-Assessment Under a Property Tax, in The
Property Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 94.
But self-assessment need not be the first step in the system. Competitive assessment
ought to be quite successful if the government pays a commission, or finder's fee, to any
competitive assessor who succeeds in increasing tax revenues. Instead of hiring assessors,
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of professional assessors.
With a small modification, competitive assessment can be made
responsive to the criticism discussed in the previous section that
idiosyncratic owners should not bear a heavier tax burden. The
competitive assessment system just described already offers some
relief to the idiosyncratic owner. In the simple self-assessed system, after all, the owner with unique tastes must come to monetary
terms with his own tastes or risk the prospect of a forced sale. At
least competitive assessment allows the owner to avoid moving. So
long as he is willing to pay higher taxes for those idiosyncracies
that are shared by a competitive assessor, he retains ownership of
his property. Moreover, the competing assessors may never assess
at a level that includes idiosyncratic tastes, thus permitting the
owner to sit back and pay the lower property taxes.
Competitive assessment, by encouraging multiple assessments
with a reward feature, is able to do a still better job of coddling the
idiosyncratic owner by borrowing from the concept of a secondprice auction. 44 Put somewhat simplistically, competitive assessments can be modified so as not to penalize the owner's tastes if
they are so idiosyncratic that only one or two other parties share
them.
To illustrate the objection to the idiosyncratic penalty and the
modification that responds to it, assume that K adores his garden
and view and would require $100,000 to be satisfied with the prospect of moving. Most citizens would pay $50,000 for K's property.
The property has previously been assessed at $50,000 and K has
been paying taxes on this amount. L is a professional assessor who
would like to earn a commission from the local government under
the government will essentially purchase assessments in the marketplace. If studies reveal
an unacceptable coefficient of dispersion, then the government will know to increase its
commission schedule. This system is still in the self-assessment family in the sense that if a
competitive assessor "bids" for the property at some price greater than the current valuation amount, the property owner must consider this internal valuation and decide whether
to force a purchase or begin to pay taxes based on the new, higher assessment.
An advantage of competitive assessment is that property owners need not expend any
effort on self-assessment until such time as a competitive assessor materializes with a bid
that exceeds the prevailing assessment. On the other hand, simple self-assessment requires
constant revaluation. Put somewhat differently, competitive assessment places the lion's
share of the valuation work in the hands of volunteers or professionals who, like other entrepreneurs, can be expected to be more efficient at their chosen work.
44 See Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. Fin.
8, 14, 20-23 (1961).
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the competitive assessment system, but he is afraid to assess the
property at much more than $50,000. L realizes that K probably
values the property at more than $50,000, but L does not know
how much more. L fears, therefore, that K will force him to
purchase the property at L's aggressively assessed amount, in
which case L may have to suffer a loss on resale. L himself has no
use for gardens and trees. To the extent that similar assessors can
be expected to avoid this risk of loss and assess the property at
$50,000, K's burden is made no heavier despite his unique tastes
and genuine happiness.
On the other hand, we might expect some assessor, M, to take a
chance on K's tastes and assess the property at, let us say, $60,000.
M is hoping that K's unique tastes, or consumer surplus, 5 coupled
with his fragile nervous system, will lead K to accept the burden of
higher property taxes, thereby generating a sizable commission for
M.4'6 Let us assume M is correct and K is rather pleased that M did
not test him with an assessment of $99,000.
Now, imagine N, who shares K's taste for gardens and views. If
N's tastes are stronger than K's and N is not wealth-constrained,
the property will pass to N under any system-often as a result of
a straight old-fashioned sale from K to N. K will profit by virtue of
being in the right place for the purpose of satisfying N's tastes. If
N shares K's tastes, however, N will want to pay $100,000 (or less)
for a property that K values internally at $100,000, but most citizens value at $50,000. If N bids $100,000 in a competitive assessment of K's property, K must sell or pay tax on that amount.
Those who object to placing heavier tax burdens on idiosyncratic
individuals will condemn self-assessment and competitive assessment for forcing K either to sell his property to someone who likes
it no better than he or to pay a higher property tax on the idiosyncratic garden and view that only he and N appreciate.
These critics can be placated by modifying the system to require
that the tax be paid on the second-highest assessment, while still

4' For a discussion of consumer surplus, see supra note 35.
,6 M cannot expect to exploit every bit of Ks extreme tastes. At some point K will allow

(force) M to buy the property and then K will offer to buy it back at a lower price. After all,
M must hope that someone else will share K's tastes and relieve M of the property. Thus,

K's "fragile nervous system" is relevant in that K is really judging the likelihood that another buyer will materialize at an idiosyncratically high price to bid for Ms newly purchased
home.
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permitting the owner to force a sale at the highest bid level. In the
above example, then, K can either sell to N at $100,000, if that is
N's assessment, or pay tax on M's announced $60,000 amount. N
will receive a commission on the increase in revenue that flows to
the government from the tax base of $60,000 as compared with the
old $50,000 assessment. Alternatively, if the government senses
that there are not enough competitors undertaking assessments, it
could divide the reward and give a small piece of it to M, the second-highest assessor. In any event, it is important to retain K's
option to sell to the highest assessor at that assessed amount, or
there will be little to stop the overzealous commission hunter. This
system, which can be called modified competitive assessment,
seeks to ensure that K will not be penalized too heavily for his
somewhat unique tastes. Despite N's high bid, K continues to be
taxed according to M's assessment.
Unfortunately, modified competitive assessment may disintegrate if N acts to maximize his reward. N can get a friend, P,
to bid $1 less than N's assessment so that if K does not wish to sell
to N, K will owe taxes on P's second highest assessment. N and P
will then share in a hefty reward that fully penalizes K's idiosyncracies. If P is a genuine assessor, and no friend of N's, then although "most citizens" value K's property at $50,000, K's high tax
burden appears less unfair because there are now three parties who
value the land highly, and $100,000 is beginning to look much
more like a proper value. But if P is N's accomplice, N will have
succeeded in undoing the modification of competitive assessment.
One possible method of restoring integrity to this modification is
to charge a fixed fee for each assessment that is submitted. On the
margin, then, each assessor will be deterred from trying to be both
highest and second-highest. This deterrence occurs because, although the amount of the commission may exceed the entry fee,
the fixed entry fee might make the expected return to the highest
assessor greater than that for highest and second-highest combined. This solution is a difficult one to construct, however, and it
is probably better to include idiosyncratic happiness in the tax
base rather than to attempt to design the assessment system
around this "problem." Alternatively, the problem is easily solved
if a sufficient number of assessors will materialize in the absence of
any commission from the government. It may well be that competitive assessment should be structured without any rewards and
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that the prospect of buying the property alone will stimulate assessors. Owners would still sell at the highest price or pay tax on the
second-highest assessment. There would be 'no danger of the collusion described above because there is no reward at stake.
More generally, the two solutions just described can be combined in a way that virtually exempts idiosyncratic tastes from taxation. As the commission-or percentage share of the increased tax
revenue-declines, the incentive for an assessor to submit a second
assessment in an attempt to drive up the second-highest bid is reduced. Coupled with a small fixed fee for each valuation, lower
commissions reduce the expected profit from collusive assessments.
If the owner's tax is based on the second-highest assessment, idiosyncratic tastes may escape taxation. If the government seeks a
more active market in assessment, then it can raise the commission
level and seek to protect idiosyncratic tastes by raising the fixed
fee (for each assessment) as well. Of course, if the property is sold
by the owner, then the assessor/buyer will begin to pay taxes based
on the actual sale price, that is, the amount of his own
47
assessment.
D.

Other Features of Self-Assessed Property Taxes

These self-assessed systems-and competitive assessment is really self-assessment in the sense that the property owner always
decides whether to sell or pay more tax-are primarily intended to
eliminate the disadvantages of the current institutional assessment
system. But because they use forced sales to assure honest valuation, these systems engender important side effects. Consider, for
example, the familiar problem of assembling a large number of
plots for a large-scale project, such as urban renovation or amusement park construction. Within the existing legal framework, to
assemble the required property the buyer must use clever intermediaries and some dissembling tactics or bargain with
"holdout" sellers who will seek to capture a share of the project's
profits. 48 In fact, before the project is begun, the investor may be
47 Note that the complexities of second-price auctions and modified competitive assessments are relevant only to the extent that it is considered undesirable to include idiosyncratic tastes in the tax base.
18 For a discussion of the holdout problem in a different context, see infra note 190 and
accompanying text. See also Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law
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discouraged from undertaking the project at all if the probability
of a holdout is substantial. Here, simple self-assessment eliminates
the buyer's (and society's) problem. The potential investor can
read the publicized self-assessment lists and figure the precise cost
of purchasing the various properties. The investor can then buy
the properties as planned. 9
A similar result will be reached in a competitively assessed system. Although the buyer cannot force sales but can only force a
choice between selling and paying higher taxes, the holdout's hand
is much weakened and the investor's incentives are stronger. After
all, a seller who holds out will be forced to pay higher property
taxes until the next assessment day, which may be a year or two
away. The threat of such a tax burden will surely discourage owners from holding out when dealing with a buyer who may be comparing a number of sites and be perfectly able to go elsewhere.
More interestingly, the investors are rewarded for innovation even
if there are holdouts.50 The investor will share in the increased tax
revenues and, therefore, will be less discouraged at the outset by
the prospect of holdouts. These two observations combine to illustrate a third effect of competitive assessment on the holdout problem: a potential holdout seller will know that the buyer is now
somewhat less likely to meet the seller's inflated price and more
likely to be satisfied with a commission on the holdout's higher
future taxes. Sellers therefore will be less likely to hold out than
they are under institutional assessment.
It is a small step from forced sales and holdouts to eminent domain. A simple self-assessment system largely relieves courts from
the difficult task of determining "just compensation." The condemnor simply pays the self-assessed amount and is entitled to the
property. Such a system eliminates the bias that exists against
small condemnees, who are loathe to expend litigation costs when
little is at stake and therefore are more likely to accept the government's offer for their property. To be sure, if the taking is easy to
predict, then property owners may inflate their self-assessments
and wait for the government's project to come along. In such cases,
the courts may resort to traditional valuation, although the ap-

of Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 141-42 (1982).
19 This advantage of self-assessment was suggested in N. Tideman, supra note 17, at 60.
10 If there are no holdouts, the investor's rewards lie in the project's profits.
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praisal job may be somewhat easier when earlier self-assessments
by the condemnee and his neighbors are put into evidence. Similarly, competitive assessments (modified or not) may be evidence
useful to a court in determining the value of condemned property;
but because under the terms of competitive assessment owners
cannot be forced to sell, the need for institutional assessment
remains.
The power to force a sale has some unexpected effects. A buyer
who seeks to racially integrate a neighborhood will succeed more
easily. Sellers who are fiercely opposed to such integration will pay
dearly in the form of higher taxes. At first, it may appear equally
likely for a group to combine and force an owner out of an area by
requiring him to pay astronomical taxes unless he moves. Upon
closer inspection, however, one realizes that any persecuted owner
can take the windfall purchase price he receives and reinvest it in
his assessment of, or bid for, another property in the same area.
Because it is much easier to concentrate on buying a small number
of properties than it is to "defend" a large number, integration will
be easier to accomplish than segregation.
It is perhaps unfortunate that these side effects to self-assessment exist. Although these consequences seem to be positive, they
are controversial and distract attention from the advantages of
self-assessment as a simple valuation system.5 1 In Part H, the advantages of self assessment and disadvantages of institutional assessment are further examined in the context of determining tort
damages.
II.
A.

SELF-ASSESSED TORT DAMAGES

The Limits and Potential of Self-Determined Damages

The criticisms of the current system of determining tort damages are so familiar that little new material need be developed.5 2
"I One other difficulty that would be generated by self-assessment concerns the treatment
of encumbrances on property. If an underassessor leases his land for a 20-year period, the
threat posed by a forcing buyer will not be substantial. This problem can be solved in much
the same way as the system deals with adjacent plots of land: each substantial interest in
the property will be recorded, separately assessed, and taxed. See Holland & Vaughn, An
Evaluation of Self-Assessment Under a Property Tax, in The Property Tax and Its Administration, supra note 8, at 111-12.
52 The most persistent and vocal criticism has come from advocates of no-fault insurance.
An early and widely quoted example is the "Columbia Plan." The committee that drafted
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Although few citizens realize the extent of dispersion about the
mean assessment ratio for property taxes, for example, any newspaper or magazine reader is acquainted with the widely varying
damages awarded to victims of accidental injuries and with the
enormous costs of administering the tort system. 5 Tort law provides a damage remedy to the victims of a wide variety of injuries-including losses from medical expenses, property damage,
and damage to reputation-but perhaps the most intractable issues arise in the determination of lost earning capacity.54 This section focuses on developing a self-assessment system that eliminates
or minimizes the need for courts and juries to measure lost earning
capacity after the loss has been sustained. A later section considers

this plan states:
This [fault] system of litigation has certain marked defects: (1) the imposition on
the plaintiff and on the defendant of the burden of producing evidence as to fault,
although the accident itself has often hindered or prevented them from obtaining
witnesses; (2) the difficulty of ascertaining the facts sought, even where the best evidence is obtainable, because witnesses who are neither trained nor prepared to observe cannot, after the lapse of months or even years, enable a jury, which has no
training in fact finding, to fix the blame for an accident caused by events which succeeded each other in the space of a few seconds; (3) the impossibility of fixing damage accurately,since there are no recognized criteriaof the value of pain or of life or
of disability; (4) the delay, especially in the large cities, caused by waiting for trial,
and aggravated in some cases by appeal; (5) the heavy cost of attorneys' fees which
generally range from 25% to 50% of the amount recovered; (6) the financial irresponsibility of many motorists who cause accidents; (7) the burden cast upon the courts
and the consequent congestion of all judicial business in large cities, due to the volume of motor vehicle accident litigation.
Columbia Univ. Council for Research in the Social Sciences, Report by the Comm. to Study
Compensation for Automobile Accidents 200-01 (1932) (emphasis added).
Professors Keeton and O'Connell criticize the tort system because it: (1) critically
overcompensates and undercompensates many injured persons; (2) is cumbersome and slow;
(3) often is unfair; (4) costs too much to operate; and (5) creates too many opportunities for
dishonesty. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 1-3 (1965).
Although much of the criticism of the tort system concentrates on auto accidents, there is
no conceptual reason so to limit the attack on the existing tort system. See W. Rokes, NoFault Insurance 329-68 (1971) (citing 558 sources that criticize the current tort system, propose a no-fault system, support the present fault principles, or offer some combination of
these positions).
13 See, e.g., Why Everybody is Suing, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 4, 1978, at 50-51. See
also Note, Advertising the Economics of High Jury Awards: The Insurance Industry's Bid
for Prospective Jurors to Tighten Their Purse Strings, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1175 (1980)
(outlining the insurance industry's public plea to prospective jurors to keep personal injury
awards low and noting the bar's subsequent allegations of jury tampering).
See O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New
"Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 749, 759.
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the usefulness of the self-assessment principle for other types of
tort damages.
Just as the discussion in Part I did not consider the wisdom or
incidence of a property tax, the concern here is with a system for
self,assessing tort damages and not with the underlying questions
of the assignment and extent of tort liability. Self-assessment accepts the prevailing notions of when and on whom the burden of
tort liability ought to be imposed. In fact, the self-assessment system that will be proposed takes the compensation, admonition,5 5
and deterrence goals of tort law quite seriously."' It is a system
that seeks to compensate injured parties more accurately and efficiently than the current legal regime-but it is also a system that
attempts to deter accidents as efficiently as possible.57
Specifically, the following discussion deals with what can be
called the "second half" of the tort trial. Self-assessment makes its
court appearance after the tortfeasor has already been found liable
to the injured party or his family in the first half, or liability portion, of the trial. The question is then one solely of damage determination, and more particularly, of the extent of the victim's lost
future earning capacity."' In sum, a self-assessed tort system attempts to save the costs of damage determination that are associated with the second half of the conventional tort trial.5 '

5 See G. White, Tort Law in America 237-38 (1980) (expressing approval of the ability of
tort law to sanction or censure undesirable noncriminal conduct). The admonitory characteristics and goals of various tort systems are not discussed in this article. The reader should
note, however, that self-assessment preserves the admonitory function of tort law by leaving
the first half, or liability portion, of the tort trial intact.
" Calabresi suggests that the principal goals of any accident law are fairness and reduction of costs. As to the latter, he suggests three "subgoals": (1) reducing the number and
severity of accidents, (2) reducing the societal costs resulting from accidents, and (3) reducing the costs of administering the treatment of accidents. See G. Calabresi, The Costs of
Accidents 26-31 (1970).
57See generally R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §§ 6.2-6.17 (2d ed. 1977).
58 Analytically, it is convenient to conceive of the trial as taking place in two steps or

halves. Often, of course, the trial will actually be bifurcated into separate liability and damage determinations. Trial judges may order such bifurcation to prevent evidence of the
plaintiff's damages from prejudicing the jury on the liability issue.
" Estimates of the costs associated with damage determination seem to be unavailable,

but the overall drain on resources by tort trials is quite incredible. See, e.g., Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, 1980 Ann. Rep. of the Director (reporting similar information for
the federal court system); 1975 U.S. Dep't of Justice Nat'l Center for State Courts, State
Court Caseload Statistics Ann. Rep. 51 (recording the volume of cases and tort cases).
Motor vehicle accident litigation alone has consumed tremendous resources. See Depart-
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Self-assessment in torts will yield a system in which the amount
of damages awarded is more predictable than it is at present. Most
victims can be expected to prefer predictable compensation in the
event of an accident. After all, a family may want to take steps to
protect itself against the lost earnings of one of its members. It is
easier to do this accurately if potential damage awards are predictable.6 0 Nevertheless, both because risk preferences and planning
needs are themselves difficult to predict and quantify, and because
the discussion later in this essay emphasizes the planning potential
within a self-assessed system, the discussion now proceeds as if the
single criticism of the current tort system were its tremendous administrative costs.
Although these administrative costs result from court appearances, settlement attempts, procedural requirements, and many
other components, it is clear that each of these components grows
larger as the number of litigable issues increases. Thus, even if the
question of liability remains, if the determination of lost earning
capacity can be removed from the set of litigable issues, trials will
be simpler, settlement negotiations less complex, and bureaucratic
needs greatly reduced. If damages other than lost earning capacity
can also be determined in a fashion simpler than the one that now
prevails, then, of course, administrative costs will be further
reduced.
The emphasis in this section on the dual goals of reducing administrative costs and optimally deterring accidents is meant to
highlight the dissimilarity between the aims of self-assessment and
"no-fault" systems. In a prototypical no-fault tort system, 6 1 it is
the first half of the trial that is directly avoided. The system dictates a recovery by the injured party without any fault or liability
determination.6 2 To some extent, of course, various nonfault pro-

ment of Transp., Auto. Accident Litig., A Report of the Fed. Jud. Center to the Dep't of
Transp. (1970) (reporting that such litigation occupied 11% of judges' time in federal district courts and 17% of judges' time in state courts of general jurisdiction). These percentages convert to more than $130 million in court costs. The average cost per trial is about
$4,200 in a state court and $7,800 in a federal court. Id.
60 The less predictable these awards are, the more difficult it is for a family to be certain
about its future income and expenses. Thus, the assertion in the text relies on the general
preference for certainty and the distaste for "volatility risk." See W. Klein, Business Organization and Finance 147-48, 151-53 (1980).
61See generally R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 52.
02 Professors Keeton and O'Connell provide that: "Basic and added protection...
for
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posals preserve the ability of a severely injured party to sue a
tortfeasor6 5 That is, both halves of the traditional tort trial remain
available in some cases. Yet it is by eliminating a large number of
these traditional suits that no-fault is expected to decrease administrative costs. " Once the first half of the trial is avoided, a nofault system must still determine the level of compensation. There
are a number of ways of accomplishing this task, 5 but it is fair to
generalize that compensation would come from first-party insurance and that the costs of determining compensation would be reduced by eliminating or greatly modifying recovery for pain and
suffering6 6 and by utilizing compensation "schedules" that would
dictate some payment levels and place ceilings on various
6
payouts.
' To the extent that compensation is not precisely predetermined, there will be room for arbitration and litigation and,
therefore, some remaining administrative costs.
In sum, a no-fault system is bound to save administrative costs,
increase the number of injuries that are compensable s unless there

persons suffering loss from accidental injury are [sic] due under the conditions in this Act
without regard to fault." Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 323 (exempting all those covered under the basic plan from tort liability unless
there is more than $5,000 of pain and suffering at stake, or $10,000 of other damges). See
also R. Keeton, Insurance Law § 4.10 (1971) (describing the preservation of tort claims
under the Massachusetts and Puerto Rican no-fault statutes). But see C. Gregory, H.
Kalven & R. Epstein, Cases & Materials on Torts 888-93 (3d ed. 1977) (noting the Report of
the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand,
which proposes to abolish virtually all tort actions in favor of a no-fault, scheduled system).
4 No-fault plans aim to decrease the number of trials while at the same time attempting
to increase the number of persons actually compensated. See R. Posner, supra note 57, §
6.16, at 156 (noting that the strategy of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan is to
increase the number of accident victims who are compensated but to reduce the average
compensation).
6 For a comparison of benefits packages provided for by state no-fault statutes as of
February, 1978, see ABA Special Comm. on Auto. Ins., Legislation, Automobile No-Fault
Insurance, app. B at 78 (1978) (summarizing state no-fault statutes).
68 See, e.g., R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 52, at 305, 358-62.
87 Id. at 309 (limiting recovery for work loss and placing a ceiling on any single total
recovery).
To the extent that a no-fault system does not use scheduled damages but instead tries to
pay for losses as they occur, it must refuse to compensate for some elements of damage or
rely arbitrarily on past data rather than examine the victim's circumstances for a determination of the true damages that have been incurred. See R. Keeton, Insurance Law § 4.10
(1971) (noting that under the Massachusetts no-fault statute recovery for lost earning power
is limited to 75% of the injured person's average weekly wage for the year immediately
preceding the accident).
"8Claimants will, after all, recover regardless of fault and need not risk the loss of court
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are large deductibles,6 9 and decrease the average recovery 0 except
to the extent that cost savings are passed on and the plaintiffs
legal costs are decreased. On the other hand, a self-assessment system will save different administrative costs, 7 1 probably save less of
these costs, leave unchanged the number of compensable injuries,
and place no arbitrary limits on recoveries. Self-assessment seeks
to yield full compensation for victims. Moreover, it does not resort
to first-party insurance for each recovery and, therefore, leaves undisturbed the deterrence feature of the current fault-based tort
system.
B.

The Difficulty of Institutionally Assessing Lost Earning
Capacity

That tort damages are, as the 'current system's critics suggest,7 2
both expensive and widely fluctuating in amount results directly

from the difficult task of determining lost earning capacity. Consider a relatively simple case in which a tortfeasor has been found
responsible for a victim's injury and resultant unemployment during a two-year convalescence commencing after the trial's conclusion.73 Ideally, the injured party has been on a stable career path
and there will be little disagreement about the expected salary for
the next two years. Still, the court will make its award in a lump
sum 7 4-that is, the defendant will pay the determined damages to
costs in making their claims under a no-fault system.
" Large deductibles will decrease the number of insurance claims. These deductibles
would need to be significantly greater than the amount that currently triggers a lawsuit in
order to yield fewer recoveries than the traditional tort system.
70 There will be more small claims (because a claimant need not risk the costs of litigation) and effective ceilings on some large claims. See supra note 67.
71 Self-assessment will save administrative costs associated with the second half of the
tort trial. To some extent, of course, the costs of assessment decisions are shifted from an
institutional assessor to self-assessors. The removal of these assessments from the reach of
the courtroom and the adversarial process will itself decrease costs. Moreover, the self-assessor, who is more familiar with the necessary details, can be expected to function more
accurately and less expensively.
71 See supra note 52.
73 Normally there will be pretrial evidence to help or hinder forecasters of post-trial
events. For expository ease, the discussion in the text assumes a trial immediately after the
injury.
7 See 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 25.2 (1956) (noting that the "principle
of single recovery" requires the present determination of future damages and is, therefore,
difficult to carry out and is immutable once decided).
An alternative to the lump sum payment is a system of periodic payments that can in-
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the plaintiff in one stroke. Each dollar that would have been
earned in the second year is less valuable than a dollar earned in
the first year; the latter dollar can, after all, earn interest until the
next year arrives. To offset this interest-earning capacity, the court
must discount the earnings to their present value. 75 What interest
rate should be used in this discounting process? 76 What about the

crease or decrease as the victim's condition improves or declines. See generally Fleming,
Damages: Capital or Rent?, 19 U. Toronto L.J. 295 (1969) (comparing and contrasting lump
sum awards and periodic payments in a comparative law framework); Henderson, Periodic
Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734 (1980) (advocating adoption of the
Model Act for Periodic Payment of Judgments of the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws). See also Gretchen v. United States, 618 F.2d 177, 181 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1980) (suggesting that although periodic remedies were unavailable to the federal courts
absent specific legislative authorization, the parties could negotiate a settlement in the form
of an annuity subject to amendment if conditions changed). But see R. Posner, supra note
57, § 6.13, at 144-45 (advocating lump sum payments on two economic grounds: economizing
on administrative costs and avoiding the disincentive effects of tying continued payments to
continued disability).
75 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916) (in comparing damages recoverable
for the deprivation of future benefits, the principle of limiting recovery to compensation
requires that adequate allowance be made for the earning power of money).
7' The rate of interest to be used in the discounting process is by no means a settled issue
of law. See, e.g., Blue v. Western Ry., 469 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.) (error to instruct jury to
reduce award through the utilization of an unusually high interest rate equivalent to the
return on high-grade corporate securities prevailing at the time and place of trial; rather,
jury should have been instructed to reduce the award for loss of future earnings through the
use of an appropriate interest rate over the period of the remaining anticipated work life of
plaintiff), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1972); Wilkinson v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K.,
366 F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1973), modified mem., 538 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976) (because the
court allowed the plaintiff the benefit of present economic conditions in computing his future losses, it is appropriate to recognize the fact of present high interest rates and use five
percent as the discount rate for computing present value of future losses); Greene v. Wright,
365 So. 2d 551 (La. App. 1978) (use of discount rate of six and one-eighth percent ruled
neither improper nor inaccurate); Daniels v. Anderson, 195 Neb. 95, 237 N.W.2d 397 (1975)
(use of discount rate of six percent ruled not clearly erroneous).
Although damages for loss of future earnings are uniformly discounted to present value,
damages for future pain and suffering usually are not. See, e.g., O'Byrne v. St. Louis S.W.
Ry., 632 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980) (although damages awarded for future earnings and medical expenses should be reduced to present value, damages for future pain and suffering
should not); Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (under Georgia law,
award for future pain and suffering need not be reduced to present value), aff'd, 604 F.2d
417 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., 390 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Fla.
1974) (recognizing that although it is inappropriate to discount damages awarded for pain
and suffering, it is permissible to consider the probable yearly return on the lump sum
award in assessing the amount to be awarded). But see Oberhelman v. Blount, 196 Neb. 42,
241 N.W.2d 355 (1976) (finding it just as essential that the value of future pain and suffering be reduced to present worth as it is that the value of loss or impairment of future earnings be reduced to its present worth).
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fact that next year's job, however stable, would probably have
yielded a salary that would increase along with inflation? Need the
court listen to economic forecasters predict the future inflation
rate," or can inflation be ignored on the grounds that the lump
sum recovery can be invested in a vehicle that keeps up with inflation?"8 Does this mean that inflation and the interest rate offset
each other,79 or is there a "real" rate of interest that is positive and
must be used in the discounting process even in a world with no
7 Whether courts should entertain testimony regarding inflation to offset or reduce the
discount rate is probably the most unsettled and controversial issue in computation of damage awards. Compare Sauers v. Alaska Barge, 600 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1979) (failure to take
inflation into account in some appropriate manner in calculating the size of plaintiff's damage award constituted error when court was faced with sound and substantial evidence pertaining to the impact of inflation), United States v. English, 521 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975)
(trier of fact may take into account future estimates of changes in the purchasing power of
money in arriving at a damage award under California law, but only changes based on sound
and substantial evidence), and District of Columbia v. Barriteau, 399 A.2d 563 (D.C. 1979)
(it is proper for the jury to consider the impact of future inflation in arriving at future loss
of income in personal injury cases) with Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1975) (ruling that the influence on future damages of possible inflation or deflation is
too speculative a matter for judicial determination), In re United States Steel Corp., 436
F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970) (declining to permit the prospect of a future decline in the
purchasing power of the dollar to be used to offset the reduction to present value), and
Sleeman v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 414 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1969) (district court's decision not
to discount award, based on inflationary trends, ruled improper).
Harper and James sum up the problem as follows:
Future trends in the value of money are necessarily unknown and so always render
such damages speculative in a way we cannot escape. If the estimates represent a
straight-line projection of present living costs, they will be frustrated by fluctuations
either way. If prophecy of change is heeded, frustration will follow if no change, or
the opposite change, occurs.
F. Harper & F. James, supra note 74, § 25.11, at 1325.
See also Formuzis & O'Donnell, Inflation and the Valuation of Future Economic Losses,
38 Mont. L. Rev. 297 (1977); Note, Future Inflation and the Undercompensated Plaintiff, 4
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359 (1973); Note, Future Inflation, Prospective Damages, and the Circuit
Courts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 105 (1977).
78 Corporate revenues, for example, vary with the price level so that corporate earnings
and stock market prices also vary with inflation. This is not to say that investments in the
stock market outperform other investments during an inflationary period. J. Lorie & M.
Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 17-20 (1973).
79 Two state courts have recently decided that, as a matter of law, the discount rate is
always offset entirely and equally by inflation. See Beaulieu v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska
1967) (award for loss of future earnings need not be reduced to present value); Kaczkowski
v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980) (as a matter of law, future inflation shall be
presumed equal to future interest rates with these factors offsetting).
See also R. Posner, supra note 57, § 6.13, at 148 (noting that there is an economic case for
using this "apparently naive method" for the estimation of lost earnings in an accident
case).
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inflation?" ° A few minutes with a calculator will convince the
reader and the court that a small percentage difference in the discount rate will have an enormous impact on more extensive recoveries that involve discounting over many years. 1 Perhaps the receipt of a lump sum is itself of value, as it opens investment
options that are unavailable to the employed individual who must
wait each year for his funds. 2
What about the fact that this tort recovery will be tax-free to
the recipient?s8 Should the injured party recover pre-tax earning
capacity, perhaps on deterrence grounds; 4 and if not, should the
court entertain expert testimony on the likelihood of changes in

so

See Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) (ruling
that inflation should be considered in estimating the present value of lost future wages;
noting that courts cannot fail to recognize that inflation is a dominant factor on the current
economic scene and, despite episodic recessions, is likely to be so for the forseeable future;
further noting that there is a fairly constant relationship between interest and inflation
rates so that it is more reasonable to make a prediction about the relationship of both rates
than about the level of interest rates alone; and, finally, suggesting but not requiring a two
percent discount rate); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975)
(discount rate of 4.14% offset by inflation rate of 2.87%, yielding 1.27% discount rate,
rounded up to 1.5%, ruled not improper under Connecticut law).
81 See, e.g., S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, Economic Handbook § 3:2, at 30 (2d
ed. 1975) (computing the value of $100,000 due in 10 years to be $82,000, $61,400, and
$38,600 at discount rates of 2%, 5%, and 10%, respectively).
82 See Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 719 (1978)
(noting that the present value of an income stream should itself be discounted to reflect the
uncertainty of its actual receipt). But see F. Harper & F. James, supra note 74, § 25.2, at
1303-04 (pointing to the disadvantages of a lump sum award which is often unwisely invested so that it yields income that is an unstable substitute for the earnings that were lost).
It would seem that a lump sum can be invested in a way that complements the risk attitude of the investor. On the other hand, future wages depend on the employer's stability
and future decisions so that their riskiness is less easily manipulated by an employee than is
the riskiness of a capital investment by its investor.
83 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1976).
84 An additional complication derives from the fact that the income obtained from investing the lump sum award will be taxable. Although the deterrence argument is a strong one,
see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text, the general rule favors the use of pre-tax
income, for reasons of simplicity. See, e.g., Griffin v. General Motors Corp., 1980 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 937, 402 N.E.2d 402 (the assumption that plaintiff's wage loss is to be measured by gross
earnings before taxes is in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority); Girard Trust
Corn Exch. Bank v. Philadelphia Transp., 410 Pa. 530, 190 A.2d 293 (1963) (adopting the
majority rule that in fixing damages for the determination of decedent's earning capacity,
the income tax consequences of the matter should not be taken into account). See also Annot., 63 A.L.R. 2d 1393 (1959). But see Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Lenpelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980)
(rejecting the notion that the introduction of evidence describing a decedent's estimated
after-tax earnings is too speculative or complex for a jury).
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the tax rates? Should the court, as assessor, consider the value of
fringe benefits85 or on-the-job training that may be lost?
If the injured party were not on a predictable employment
path, 6 the court will be forced to face still more issues, the most
basic of which are answerable only with brave speculation. Assume
for example, that the injured party was a second-year law student
with excellent grades and that a two-year recuperation period will
postpone the completion of law school. The starting lawyer's salary, the object of our victim's dreams, is not that far off. Even if
the discounting process can quantify the two-year delay, many difficult questions arise. A small one, of course, involves the prediction of tuition increases. Although the amount at stake may be relatively small, unless the parties can agree on an amount, the
second half of the trial will be extended to include this issue. More
important, how should the jury decide-and how much information should they receive on the question of-whether the injured
student would have opted for a lucrative big job, a less remunerative small town practice, a government job, a legal aid position, or
87
a seat in graduate school?
85 Fringe benefits are usually recoverable as items included in estimated lost earning capacity. See, e.g., In re United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1274 (6th Cir. 1970) (the
fact that court-appointed commissioners converted the parties' evaluations of the decedents'
fringe benefits to percentages of their estimated lost wages for purposes of computation
does not render the commissioners' awards subject to attack for lack of specificity); Wilkinson v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K., 366 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1973) (claimant
entitled to recover the economic fringe benefits of working as a longshoreman to the extent
that he has lost them as a result of the injury); Curry v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 1219,
1223 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (earning capacity includes the possibility of fringe benefits).
$a For a discussion of what damages to award to an injured party who was on an unemployment path, see Espana v. United States, 616 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1980) (full-time capacity
only relevant for an unemployed party who will, or is willing to, work, such as a student or
housewife; otherwise, sporadic employment is itself predictable and plaintiff is limited in
recovery to work he was actually able to obtain).
87 For a somewhat unsatisfying attempt to deal with this difficult prediction problem, see
Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974) (court finds that
decedent, a college graduate admitted to, but not yet attending law school, probably would
have chosen immediate employment as a legislative analyst instead of attending law school,
would have been hired by the National League of Cities and United States Conference of
Mayors as a GS-12 with increments in salary as provided in the federal government's GS
pay scales, would have spent eight years in which her principal occupation was childrearing
but would have remained in sufficient contact with her field to maintain her earning capacity and would have retired at age 65), rev'd in part and remanded, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1975). See also Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (award based on testimony
that plaintiff, a 19-year-old commercial art student, would have worked continuously as a

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 799 1982

800

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 68:771

If a serious injury ends the tort victim's worklife, there are additional conceptual difficulties because an employee's income over
time is, to some extent, related to the performance of the economy
as a whole. At the very least, the institutional assessor must speculate as to the victim's career path, including promotions and layoffs. 88 This task is hardly simplified by a court's willingness to extrapolate from data about past and current average earnings
within the victim's profession or industry.8 9 These averages are
computed from large pools, and the parties in a specific case will
disagree about the ways in which the victim's own talents, training,
education, promotional history, regional location, family stability,
and energies ought to modify any use of a raw average.9 0

commercial artist until normal retirement age, with interruptions for childbearing, ruled not
arbitrary or unreasonable); Whittle v. Schemm, 402 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Penn. 1975) (although in many cases that have permitted reference to the reduced earning capacity of a
student, the student was already enrolled in a specialized training program leading to a
career at the time of injury, there appears to be no requirement to this effect; when an
expert gives an opinion that is based on facts or testimony in the record, it is the jury's
function to determine what weight, if any, should be given to his testimony), aff'd, 538 F.2d
322 (3d Cir. 1976); Clinchfield Ry. v. Forbes, 57 Tenn. 174, 417 S.W.2d 210 (1966) (any
competent evidence relevant to a person's earning capacity is admissible and it is for the
jury to consider all the evidence on the question and give the proper weight to each part of
the evidence).
88 See, e.g., Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. 1974) (the probability of promotion or
progress in job status may be considered when supported by competent evidence).
88 See, e.g., Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 266 Or. 666, 677, 513 P.2d 1140, 1146
(1973) (taking judicial notice of the history of wage increases for railroad workers for the
past 25 years, including increases at an average rate of at least 5% per year with a much
higher rate of increase during the past five years, and ruling that it is not "pure speculation"
for a qualified expert witness to infer from such a part history that during the next 23 years
wage rates will continue to increase at an average of at least 5% per year).
80 See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (a more reasonable result is reached when the sex, race, personality, demonstrated intelligence and other
factors of plaintiff are balanced and one amount is reached, than when a specific figure is
assigned to any or all of the foregoing values); Baker v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 502 F.2d 638,
644 (6th Cir. 1974) (jury was entitled to consider the extent of plaintiffs injuries, his education, station in life, and character in assessing lost earning capacity); Potter v. Mulberry, 100
Idaho 429, 432, 599 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1979) (the value of one's earning capacity is ordinarily
determined from proven facts of age, capacity, state of health, present income, and other
relevant facts, rather than from the estimates and opinions of witnesses); Viator v. Gilbert,
253 La. 81, 85, 216 So. 2d 821, 822 (1968) (in attempting to arrive at the correct measure of
damages for loss of future earnings, it is essential that the court direct its attention to plaintiffs physical condition prior to the accident, his work record, the amount of his earnings
and the likelihood that he would have been able to earn similar amounts for a number of
years but for the accident); Weidmer v. Lineback, 82 S.D. 8, 13, 140 N.W.2d 597, 602 (1966)
(loss of earning capacity is an element of general damages that permits an injured party to
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Even if we assume that a likely or average promotion pattern is
"determined" and that past pay increases over time as well as pay
differentials among jobs can be used to predict the future, our task
is incomplete. To avoid double counting, the assessor should also
subtract the fraction of these promotions and increases that have
already been included by way of the discounting process and the
decision to end the case with a lump-sum award. Often such promotions are already included in damage awards as compensation
for the victim's probable productivity increases. After all, to some
extent a firm can afford increases and promotions because the firm
itself has enjoyed a productivity increase. The firm's growth may
reflect nothing more than its good fortune in being part of a growing and innovative economy. Yet, an individual who invested capital in this economy will also share in its growth. In this manner, if
the lump sum award is invested in the economy-and it is difficult
to put it elsewhere-it will in some way track the productivity increases that the injured party could have expected had he continued in the work force.
Unfortunately, this direct relationship between returns in the
capital market and the labor market does not obviate the need to
predict promotion paths and productivity increases. Some industries will outperform the average; some individuals will be promoted faster than others and earn productivity increases that in
percentage terms exceed those of the economy as a whole. The assessor must therefore predict both the increases and the fraction of
these increases that must be cast aside to avoid double counting.
This hopeless situation is further complicated by the announced
intention of the law to consider "lost earning capacity" as opposed
to actual "lost earnings.""1 To be sure, this standard makes some

recover for loss of earning power in the future based on such factors as the nature and
extent of the injury, age, life expectancy, talents, skill, experience, training, education, and
industry).
"1 Under the majority rule, a tort victim suing for damages for permanent injuries is permitted to base his recovery "on his prospective earnings for the balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished by any shortening of that expectancy as a
result of the injury." Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 594 (1974) (quoting 2 F.
Harper & F. James, supra note 74, § 24.6, at 1293-94) (emphasis in original). See also Frankel v. Todd, 393 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1968) (emphasizing that under Pennsylvania law, a jury
may consider plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity as an element of damages, even
though plaintiff was making more money at the time of trial than at date of accident); Flick
v. James Monfredo, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (the fact that earnings

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 801 1982

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 68:771

of the assessor's questions easier to answer.92 For example, the previously discussed law student ought to be awarded a recovery
based on the highest paying job available. Under the lost earning
capacity standard, there is no need to speculate that this student
might dally in a less remunerative job. In a narrow sense, this is
consonant with simple economic principles. By accepting a low
paying job in lieu of a higher paying one, an individual demonstrates that the total returns from the chosen position-monetary
and nonmonetary-are valued more than those from the job not
taken. Thus, the injured party ought to get at least the amount of
the highest offer.9 3
have increased after injury does not bar recovery for impairment of earning capacity); Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (in claim for future loss of earning
capacity, the question is to what extent the economic horizon of plaintiff has been shortened
because of the injuries); Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446, 456 (D.S.C. 1968) (in
considering damages suffered by plaintiff, it is quite clear that impairment to future earning
capacity is a necessary and proper element of damages and the fact that one is unemployed
at the time of injury does not deprive one of the right to such damages; unemployed 11year-old therefore allowed to collect for lost earning capacity); Jerz v. Humphrey, 160 Conn.
219, 222, 276 A.2d 884, 886 (1971) (in determining whether there is a loss of earning capacity, the essential question is whether the plaintiff's capacity to earn is hurt); Gault v. Monongahela Power Co., 223 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1976) (a plaintiff has the right to be compensated for impairment of his physical capacity and impairment of his ability to earn,
regardless of whether or not he intends to work); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 636-37 (W.
Va. 1974) (undoubtedly, even an infant plaintiff who has never been gainfully employed
may recover damages for impairment of his future earning capacity; during his minority, his
parents or guardians may also recover damages for such impairment or loss of earning capacity proximately resulting from the negligent conduct of defendant); Ballard v. Lumbermens. Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 608, 148 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1967) (in determining past and
future loss of earning capacity the question is not whether plaintiff would have worked by
choice, because he is entitled to compensation for his lost capacity to earn, whether he
would have chosen to exercise it or not); McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 31
Wis. 2d 378, 394, 143 N.W.2d 32, 40 (1966) (damages could be awarded for impairment of
plaintiff's capacity to teach, notwithstanding his vow of poverty upon ordination as a
priest).
92 Of course, the easiest approach in such cases would be to limit wage recovery to actual
lost wages in the plaintiff's present position, as many no-fault plans require. See, e.g., supra
note 67.
11 Although this approach would be conceptually consistent with the court's adherence to
assessing lost earning capacity, in practice courts shy away from such a position. See, e.g.,
Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1283 (D. Conn. 1974) (noting that,
because a law degree normally enhances earning capacity, a decision to assess the decedents
future earning capacity as if she had chosen employment as a legislative assistant was necessarily conservative), rev'd in part and remanded, 524 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1975).
If courts were inclined to take everything into account in their assessment of lost earning
capacity, they could award damages based on the highest possible income, but discount
them by the probability that plaintiff would have attained that level of earnings. See Schae-
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But once we accept the notion of including the nonmonetary
value of "psychic" pleasures in the calculus, the institutional assessments by judges and juries become still more disputable.

Should the jury be instructed to consider evidence about individual or average tastes for leisure time?9 4 If so, should an amount be
subtracted from the lost earning capacity that represents the leisure time now available during recuperation?

The problems associated with the use of lost earning capacity as
the standard for damage awards are the most interesting of the
valuation difficulties. Conceptually, these measurement problems

are the same as those encountered in any attempt to tax "imputed
income," or accretions to wealth that are not easily associated with
a known market transaction.9 5 If the earlier analysis concerning the
law student who chooses the low paying career path is correct, then
perhaps he should pay income taxes based on the foregone higher
salary. That the Internal Revenue Code does not go this far in defining taxable income9 8 reflects, among other things, the difficulty
of managing such a system and society's uneasiness about taking

capacity as seriously as reality.
Still, given that the law professes to award lost earning capacity

in the area of tort damages, it is appropriate to consider both the
valuation problems thereby raised and the extent to which instititional assessors abide by this standard of earning capacity. Consider the case of an injured law professor who had chosen the acafer, supra note 82, at 769 (suggesting that courts deal with uncertainty in estimating the
value of a plaintiff's lost earnings by including an expected value deduction, so that the
earnings estimate represents an average of all possible outcomes and discount for risk).
" For example, two identically injured individuals may be unequally damaged because
only one enjoys the books and television that are available during recuperation. That courts
would not differentiate among these individuals is illustrative of the failure of conventional
assessment to individualize damage awards more fully and accurately. In fact, courts might
use the availability of "leisure time" as a way of increasingthe award for pain and suffering.
See, e.g., Henderson v. S.C. Loveland Co., 390 F. Supp. 347, 352 (N.D. Fla. 1974)
("[F]ormerly active, now [plaintiff] spends most of his days doing little more than sitting,
watching television and leading a humdrum existence. With him there has been, from the
evidence before this court, a great loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, compounding and
increasing his pain, suffering and mental anguish.").
See generally 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts § 5.3 (1981).
It is congressional silence, more than any particular implication of the Code's definition
of income, see I.R.C. § 61 (1976), that saves the law student in the text from an enormous
tax bill. On the other hand, the Code does deal with imputed income in a number of small,
fragmented ways. See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 95, § 5.3.2.
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demic life rather than a lucrative tax practice. If the professor's
attorney can convince the jury that, at the time of the injury, such
a lucrative practice was still available to his client, should the damage award be based on the professor's higher hypothetical earnings
capacity? Should a laborer be able to show that he could have
taken a high paying job on the Alaska pipeline or in the Saudi
oilfields, even though such earnings would require a radical change
in lifestyle?
It appears that despite its insistence on the concept of "capacity," the case law limits the working victim's lost earnings capacity
to his chosen career path.9 7 It is suspected, for example, that the
laborer would be limited to possible promotions and income within
his industry or region,9 8 and that a law professor would be awarded
damages on the basis of professorial pay, regardless of his potential
earning capacity in private practice.
Valuing the services of the stereotypical housewife presents a familiar problem. 9 Income taxes are not imputed to the services of

See, e.g., Hanson v. Reiss S.S. Co., 184 F. Supp. 545 (D. Del. 1960) (award, based on
stone mason's pay to injured seaman who had once worked as a stone mason's apprentice,
ruled too speculative to form the foundation of a judgment); Condron v. Hurl, 46 Hawaii 66,
71, 374 P.2d 613, 618 (1962) (plaintiff's training, experience, and established line of work
supply the setting for measurement of lost earning capacity); Pinkstaff v. Pennsylvania Ry.,
24 Ill. 507, 163 N.E.2d 728 (1959) (trial judge was correct in ruling that evidence of earnings
in job available to, but not taken by, plaintiff was inadmissible); Norris v. Ehndale Elevator
Co., 216 Mich. 548, 550, 185 N.W. 696, 698 (1921) (plaintiff's damages for impairment of
earning capacity should be measured by the impairment of earning capacity in his usual
employment).
9' See, e.g., McGuire v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(conclusion that plaintiff was 100% disabled was supported by the fact that his background,
training, and past employment history were all in the field of heavy industrial work, notwithstanding the fact that he was physically able to perform nonindustrial, sedentary work).
See also Hershiser v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 102 Neb. 820, 170 N.W. 177 (1918) (where a
plaintiff seeks to prove damages accruing by reason of lost wages and earning capacity, the
inquiry should be as to what he was able to earn in or near the locality where he lived, or
where he was reasonably likely to exercise his calling, and it is error to admit evidence as to
his earning capacity at a distant point in another state where he is unlikely to labor); Texas
& P. Ry. v. Crown, 220 S.W.2d 294, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (proof of earnings before and
after the injury constitutes the best evidence of the extent of lost earning capacity).
" See Note, Tort Damages for the Injured Homemaker: Opportunity Cost or Replacement Cost?, 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 59 (1978) (outlining the evolution of the homemaker's tort
damages and current methods of valuation, and arguing that foregone opportunity costs
should be relevant and admissible evidence in ascertaining a homemaker's damages); Note,
How Much is a Good Wife Worth?, 33 Mo. L. Rev. 462, 466-73 (1968) (discussing methods
of proof for value of a wife's services-by presumption, by amounts actually paid, by testimony of family and friends, or by expert testimony). See generally Komesar, Toward a Gen-
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the housewife. Unless offset by a childcare credit or some similar
device, there is an implicit tax imposed on the housewife who takes
a paying job and hires a housekeeper to replace herself in the
home. 10° In another context, it has been argued that marital rights,
pension claims, and divorce settlements would be more equitable if
the value of intrafamily services, such as housework, were quantified.1 01 It may appear that the common-law right of tort recovery
for a wife's services was an early percursor of this "capacity" or
nonmarket approach that is now suggested in other areas. The reality of the matter is, of course, that the law was sensitive to the
loss of services from a chattel damaged in tort, and a wife was re0 2
garded as her husband's chattel.1
If a court is willing to consider the value of a housewife's services
as something other than what it would cost to hire a housekeeper
eral Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J. Legal Stud. 457 (1974) (arguing that all personal
injury damages can be analyzed profitably in the same terms as those accepted for earning
capacity-where the value of time is the crux of the matter-and that the present damage
structure may have disregarded, or at least misperceived, much of the value of the time
loss).
100 See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 95, § 5.3. See generally Weitzman, Legal Regulation of
Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1169, 1187 (1974) (noting that the woman's obligations as wife, homemaker and mother are so basic to the legal conception of
family roles that one may view a wide range of case law that supposedly deals with other
issues as merely a vehicle for ensuring that women are not sidetracked from their domestic
duties).
101 See Foster & Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. Fain. L.
187 (1977-78) (urging that, despite difficulties in evaluation, services as a wife, homemaker,
mother and career builder for her husband may be given a price tag and that homemaker
services must be recognized as significant in determining the economic incidents of divorce;
special reference and discourse given to pension and retirement benefits as issues upon divorce); Weitzman, supra note 100, at 1192 (noting that the separate-as opposed to the
community-property system disregards the wife's contribution to the family property, that
the woman who has contributed to the growth of her husband's business, career, property,
or income during the marriage generally finds that her contribution to the partnership is
unrecognized in law, and that upon dissolution the partnership is treated as a one-man business, and she is cheated out of a fair share for her half of the effort).
10, Komesar, supra note 99, at 469-71 nn.27-31. See, e.g., Snashell v. Metropolitan R.R.,
19 D.C. (8 Mackey) 399 (1890) (Married Woman's Property Act notwithstanding, a married
woman does not possess the capacity to sue in her own name for personal injuries, or the
capacity to make any contract relating to them); Shaddock v. Town of Clifton, 22 Wis. 114
(1867) (in an action by husband and wife to recover for injuries done to the person of the
wife, such damages, when recovered, are not the separate property of the wife under the
statute enlarging the rights of married women as to property; thus the damages belong to
the husband; he may reduce them to possession and dispose of them as he pleases; he controls the action and may continue it or give a release; any settlement made or discharge
properly given by him will bind the wife).

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 805 1982

806

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 68:771

and reimburse the husband for loss of consortium,0 3 then the difficulties that attend the prediction of a career path-other than the
one in which the victim has recently traveled-will again arise.
The existence of these difficulties should not obscure the powerful
argument in favor of such a capacity-based recovery. 1°4 The family
may have chosen to go through life with one taxable breadwinner
and a housewife, even though this housewife could have earned far
more in the marketplace than does the hypothetical housekeeper
whose services are frequently imputed to her by the assessing
court.10 5 The family has thus demonstrated, tax considerations
aside, that the value of having this healthy housewife in its home
exceeds her value in the marketplace.
It would be a mistake, however, to award as damages to an injured housewife the income she could have earned in the market.
The cost of employing a professional housekeeper would have to be
subtracted first. After all, this is a real cost that would have been
incurred in the event of such employment. If the housewife's earnings are to be hypothesized, then the costs necessary to generate
these earnings must also be considered.106
The cost of hiring a housekeeper and reimbursing the husband for loss of consortium,
commonly known as the "replacement cost approach," is the approach used pervasively by
courts today. See, e.g., Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 712 (5th Cir. 1967)
(upon wrongful death of wife and mother, damages for the value of her lost services are best
calculated as the cost to her husband and children of replacing those services); Legare v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (amount of damages in wrongful death of
wife and mother based on the expense, to the father of providing the children a home, the
services of a suitable person to run it and minister to the children's needs, and the services
of domestic help); Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (in
action to recover for death of mother, plaintiff was entitled to offer testimony of professional home economist to prove estimated replacement costs to surviving.children caused by
deprivation of their mother's services). For discussion of an alternative approach, see infra
note 104.
104 See R. Posner, supra note 57, § 6.13, at 145; Note, Tort Damages for the Injured
Homemaker. Opportunity Cost or Replacement Cost?, supra note 99 (arguing that the opportunity cost approach permits a high degree of certainty in assessing the minimum value
of the services to the family above mere replacement cost without allowing either jury conjecture or self-interested statements by the individual.)
103

105 See supra note 103.
10" These costs can include items as varied as workclothes and housekeepers. To the extent that courts adopt an uneconomic approach and adhere to the use of replacement rather
than opportunity cost, the deductions for necessary expenses need not be made. To be sure,
under either approach, when housewives are recuperating, they or their families can recover
for housekeeping expenses that are incurred. See, e.g., Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp.
254, 279 (D. Utah 1968) (a plaintiff may recover, as special damages, medical costs, property
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More generally, institutional assessments must consider not only
the capacity to earn but also the varying cost of living. 107 Such additional analysis may indicate that the assessment of lost earning
capacity is somewhat simplified by the realities of living costs. In
the case of the recuperating law student, for example, although it
may be difficult to predict whether this victim would have earned
a big city salary or the lower income associated with tendering legal services to the rural poor, the higher living costs in big cities
and the lower entertainment and clothing costs incident to a rural
job would tend to lessen the net monetary gap between the two
career options.
In sum, the need to consider living costs as well as earning possibilities further complicates the task of institutional assessment of
tort damages. The prediction of these living costs involves various
areas of speculation. In the context of a trial, such determinations
may take up considerable court time and perhaps even require the
testimony of expert witnesses. The frequently inverse relationship
between earned income and living costs, however, implies that the
assessor's prediction as to the injured party's career path is less
likely to mar the accuracy of the damage determination.1 08

damage, and the cost of household help necessitated by the injury); McCluggage v. United
States, 296 F. Supp. 485, 488 (S.D. Ohio 1966) (plaintiff-husband entitled to recover damages as compensation for his expenses in caring for his wife, and for losses of his wife's
services in the home, consortium, and conjugal society); Poche v. Frazier, 232 So. 2d 851,
860 (La. App.) (sum expended to pay for care of children, while mother was unable to do so,
was a legitimate expense arising as a direct consequence of the accident and should have
been included in judgment), cert. denied, 256 La. 266, 236 So. 2d 36 (1970).
107 See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 368 (6th Cir. 1978) (considering
past statistical evidence submitted by economic experts concerning changes in the cost of
living from time to time); Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975) (in assessing
the amount of damages in both death and injury cases, Minnesota juries may consider "the
inflationary trend of the economy" or "the present low purchasing value of money and the
high cost of living"); Dawydowycz v. Quady, 300 Minn. 436, 200 N.W.2d 478 (1974) (factors
relevant in determining damages include loss of earning power and the inflationary trend of
the economy); Clinchfield R.R. v. Forbes, 57 Tenn. App. 174, 190, 417 S.W.2d 210, 217
(1966) (recognizing that no mathematical rules for a computation have ever been formulated
to make verdicts and judgments uniform in negligence cases, but requiring courts to consider the nature and extent of the injuries, the suffering, expenses, diminution of earning
capacity, inflation, age, life expectancy and amounts awarded in similar cases).
105 In considering the proper treatment of living costs in the determination of damages, it
becomes clear that the split among jurisdictions regarding the use of the survivors' perspectives or the estate's perspective in the event of a fatal injury is really not a serious one. See
generally 1 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death §§ 3:1-3:69 (2d ed. 1975). In general, in
a loss-to-survivors approach the tortfeasor pays the survivors only what they would have
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One final problem for the institutional assessor concerns the
proper use of mortality tables 0 9 in those cases requiring an accurate assessment of the years remaining in the injured party's life. 110
The assessor must decide whether to use mortality statistics that
are general or ones that are finely tuned for a specific race, sex,

received from the decedent had he not died. In the loss-to-estate approach, the survivors
recover all that would have come into the decedent's estate had he not died. If it is the value
to survivors that ought to be measured, the compensable damage is the lost earning capacity--difficult as it may be to determine-minus both the amount that the victim would have
himself consumed and the amounts that the victim would have contributed to beneficiaries
other than his legal survivors. If the value-to-estate standard is in place, then again, it seems
correct to take the capacity to consume as seriously as the capacity to earn. The two standards will yield comparable results except insofar as the survivors under the first standard
must prove that the victim's income would have inured to their benefit.
101 Mortality tables are generally held to be admissible but are not considered conclusive
as to life expectancy. See, e.g., Farmers Union Federated Coop. Shipping Ass'n v. McChesney, 251 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1958) (to assist the jury in determining the gross amount of
lost earnings, where such decreased or lost earning capacity is considered permanent, standard mortality tables are admissible); James v. State, 154 So. 2d 497, 501 (La. App. 1963)
(future wage losses based on mortality tables); Sorenson v. Cargill, Inc., 281 Minn. 480, 488,
163 N.W.2d 59, 65 (1968) (mortality tables based on the average life of a large group of
persons have considerable evidentiary value, but they are not decisive of the injured person's life expectancy or of the number of years his earning capacity would have continued
undiminished if he had not been injured). But see Morrison v. State, 516 P.2d 402, 406
(Alaska 1973) (where no evidence was presented from which the court reasonably could infar that appellant had a shorter than normal life expectancy at the time of the accident, it
was error to determine life expectancy to be other than that shown in standard mortality
table; although mortality table is not binding upon court, there must be some evidence in
order to justify departure from the table).
Many states make mortality tables admissible by statute, and some states either set out
tables in the statutes or direct the court to commonly-used tables. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-25-102 (1973); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-46 (1981).
In calculating lost earning capacity, the court actually wants to know, not how long the
injured party would have lived, but how long he would have earned income. This can be
done by merely postulating a retirement age, see, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 & n.24 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd in part and remanded, 524 F.2d 384
(2d Cir. 1975), or by using work-life tables, see, e.g., Larsen v. IBM Corp., 87 F.R.D. 602, 611
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
"I In the case of a nonfatal injury, mortality tables enable the court to award damages
based on the expected life of the victim had there been no injury. See supra note 91. As a
result of the tort, the plaintiff's actual expected life may be much shorter. Thus, the
tortfeasor compensates the victim for his shortened life expectancy. Some courts, however,
have rejected this logic. See, e.g., Eblinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1976) (following
the minority rule that shortened life expectancy caused by the injury may be used to reduce
damages when determining loss of earning capacity).
Great Britain applies the minority American rule and consequently underdeters the
tortfeasor. Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of
Damages, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 598, 700 (1962).
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family history, occupation, and location."" Moreover, a resourceful

plaintiff ought to claim that the selected mortality table be modified to exclude compensable deaths. For example, the victim who
is fatally injured at age sixty should not have his recovery diminished by the probability that another tortious injury might have
taken place at age sixty-five.' 12 After all, the first tortfeasor has
put the victim in a position such that he is no longer able to recover from the "second" tortfeasor.
The ultimate irony and disgrace of conventional tort law damage
determination is in the actual disposition of all these questions. If
counsel take these issues seriously, so that the determination of
damages is an honest attempt to compensate the unfortunate victim of a tort, the jury will be exposed to a mind-boggling series of
issues and experts. Once faced with the evidence, the jury must
speculate, calculate probabilities, and modify industry averages; in
short, the jury must do all those things that this article already has
described as being virtually impossible. Moreover, the jury must do
this for all the components of damages, not just lost earning
capacity.
The call for change in the determination of tort damages is motivated therefore by the concern that subjectivity must attend the
virtually impossible task of assessing such damages accurately. It is
not possible to adduce statistics regarding the inaccuracy of these
assessments as it was in the case of property tax assessment. Institutional property tax assessment is difficult because of the nature
of the concept of market value and because of the potential for
careless and extralegal behavior by assessors. Conventional tort
damage assessment is at least as troublesome because the path of a
human life is incredibly complex and unpredictable. The questions
and issues discussed in this section paint a depressing picture of
the likelihood of accurate institutional assessment-and no doubt
I See, e.g., O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959) (ruling appellant
entitled to have the life expectancy figure of 34.76 years used from a mortality table for
white males instead of a figure of 36.4 years from a mortality table of the general populace,
both male and female); Byrd v. Trevino-Bermea, 366 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(refusing to notice that Mexican citizens have a lower life expectancy than do those of the
United States).
I" Mortality tables do, after all, include all deaths, including compensable ones. Thus, a
simplistic use of these tables would deprive the victim's estate of what it might have recovered from another tortfeasor.
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there are still other issues11s that further complicate the valuation
task. But why spend so much of society's scarce resources on a
question that seems so unlikely to be well answered?
C.
1.

Toward Self-Assessment in Torts

Assessment By Insurance

The major challenge in designing a self-assessment system for
property was to develop a mechanism that would keep owners
from underassessing the internal value of their property. 114 In the
area of tort damages, the problem is one of overassessment. Essentially, each person determines, in advance of any injury, the
amount that he would need to be compensated for a period of lost
employment. Recall that for the present, this system is meant to
deal with lost earning capacity-the most costly part of the conventional institutional assessment 15-- and not with the other components of tort damages such as pain and suffering. Each individual will know that his response to the request for self-assessment
of lost earnings will determine the amount of his recovery in the
event of a successful tort suit. If this self-assessment plan is to be
workable, then, it must be designed to control overassessment.
The proposed self-assessment system for torts counters the ten113 One issue that can further complicate computation of awards is that of pretrial inflation. See generally Note, Pre-Assessment Inflation as a Factor in Damages, 48 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 999 (1979) (arguing that economic fluctuations that alter the value of money during the
time between measurement and assessment of damages are a factor in assessment that has
been largely ignored in American law). Note that this preassessment, or pretrial, difficulty
derives from the victorious plaintiff's inability to invest as yet unawarded recoveries during
this period. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The problem of accounting for environmental changes in the pre-assessment period arises in many assessment and self-assessment contexts and is largely passed over in this article. See infra note 192.
Another issue dealt with by the courts, but not discussed here, is recovery for loss of
enjoyment of life, an item theoretically separable from damages for pain and suffering. See
generally Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Should it be a Compensable Element of
Personal Injury Damages?, 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. 459 (1975). From the perspective of selfassessment, the average person may not know which activities to insure, but people with
special talents, such as musicians, or special capacities for enjoyment, for example in their
work, surely would know their focal points before an injury. This area of damages is thus
one especially suited to self-assessment.
114 Of course, if the prospect of a forced taking by the government, under its power of
eminent domain, were much more likely and the property tax very low, then owners would
tend to overassess and the design challenge would be quite different.
"5 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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dency toward overassessment by designating the first-party insurance coverage of the injured party as the self-assessed amount.
Thus the self-assessor is required to demonstrate the accuracy of
his valuation of damages in the event of a tort by spending premium dollars to provide for that amount of recovery in the event
of a nontortious accident. 11 6 A simple example will clarify this
technique: Q has purchased insurance that pays him $50,000 per
year in the event of unemployment that results from an accident,
such as a falling down his own basement staircase. Q pays $ X for
this insurance and continues paying these premiums for a number
of years. During this period Q falls down R's stairs during a visit to
R's home, and in the "first half" of a subsequent tort trial, R is
found negligent and responsible for all the damage. To recuperate,
Q will miss work for two years. The time-consuming and inaccurate "second half" of the trial now is avoided under the self-assessment system. R's insurance company 1 7 will pay Q an amount
equal to the present value of two years salary, at $50,000 a year.
A number of features of this plan should be noted at the outset.
The second half of the trial is not entirely eliminated. Expert testimony must still predict the length of Q's recuperation. If Q is still
to be paid in lump-sum fashion, the discounting process also must
be undertaken. Ideally, this process will utilize some low "real"
rate of interest, such as two or three percent, because the time
value of money remains after the inflationary component is removed from the current nominal interest rate.11 8 Beyond these
matters, however, virtually every other issue that makes damage
determination so difficult either disappears or diminishes in importance. The likelihood of promotion and changes in career path,
for example, are no longer subjects for litigation. Q, the individual
best able to predict his future earnings and needs, has already assessed thes& items, "announced" the amount of recovery needed
for each year of lost employment, and planned ahead based on the
knowledge of his expected recovery.

16

It is possible that a tortfeasor may be liable for injuries covered by the victim's insur-

ance coverage. The problem of simultaneously preserving deterrence by retaining tort liabil-

ity and avoiding double recoveries that overcompensate the victim is taken up below. See
infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
117 Under subrogation, Q would be paid by his own insurer in the first instance. See infra
notes 148-50 and accompanying text.

"'

See supra note 80.
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Although this self-assessment system avoids much of the second
half of the tort trial and thus saves substantial administrative
costs, some of these costs are merely transferred to the self-assessor. Just as the self-assessment system for property tax valuations sought to decrease administrative costs and increase accuracy
by shifting the assessment task to the party most familiar with the
property in question, the proposed tort system would require effort
on the part of each self-assessor. The difficult questions that complicate institutional assessments do not disappear but are shifted
to the individual who can, if he wishes, make a serious effort to
predict his own future income and needs. The advantages of selfassessment derive in part from permitting the individual whose decisions, efforts, and tastes are at issue to answer some of the valuation questions, such as the direction of career paths and consumption patterns, and in part from removing unanswerable questions,
such as interest rate trends, from the litigious atmosphere of the
courtroom. 119
A critical element of this self-assessment system is that the liability of the tortfeasor R is sensitive to the circumstances of the
injured party Q. The greater Q's earnings and needs, the greater
will be Q's self-assessment via purchased insurance coverage. The
correspondence between the tortfeasor's liability and the magnitude of the loss that results from his tort is, of course, central to
optimal deterrence and the minimization of accident costs. 12 0 The
proposed self-assessment system seeks to ensure that a potential
119Some determinants of damages, such as future career paths, taste for leisure, and special enjoyment of activities, will be easier for self-assessors to value. Other variables, such as
fluctuations in interest rates, taxes, and inflationary trends, will be no easier for the average
self-assessor than for the typical institutional assessor. With respect to these more dlfficult
"non-idiosyncratic determinants," two points ought to be noted. First, self-assessment still
will save administrative costs to the extent that it removes issues from the courtroom. Second, the confused self-assessor can still consult experts-much as the property tax self-as-""
sessor can turn to insurers-and acquire information that is likely to be superior to that
developed in a courtroom. Of course, the self-assessor must avoid relying on false information. In this regard, the marketplace might be expected to sort out good counselors from bad
at least as well as juries sort out good expert witnesses from vacuous mercenaries.
120 See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud. 13, 26-28
(1972) (noting that optimal deterrence follows from assigning the full costs of an accident to
a party, although in the absence of transaction costs the identity of the liable party may not
matter); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 46 (1972) ("For the Hand
formula to optimize safety, the rules for determining damages once the defendant's liability
has been established must measure with reasonable accuracy the social costs of accidents.").
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tortfeasor (such as R, when caring for his property) will consider
the real costs of his actions. The more certain it is that the
tortfeasor will pay the true costs of those accidents that he does
cause, the more he can be expected to act in a socially efficient
manner. Self-assessment is designed to replicate the deterrence
features of the conventional tort system. The first half of the trial
is therefore retained while the second half continues to aim for full
compensation of the tort victim.
2. Self-Assessment and the Taxability of Recoveries
Self-assessment may appear to undermine the deterrence effects
of conventional tort rules. Traditionally, tort awards ignore the
fact that had he not been injured and, instead, continued to earn
money in the course of his employment, the injured party would
have been taxed. 21 Tort reparations like insurance recoveries are
not taxed,1 22 however, and the traditional rule thus generally
overcompensates the plaintiff. But from the perspective of the deterrence goal, this existing rule is quite sensible, because the
tortfeasor should be confronted with the full cost of his actions in
order to be optimally deterred. After all, society, through its tax
collector, is now without the revenues it "expected." The fact that
some of the injured party's earnings normally accrues to the government does not alter the reality that the tortfeasor's actions have
cut off all of the victim's work effort as best measured by total
earnings. To be sure, perhaps the government should share in the
victim's recovery as compenstion for its lost revenues. That it
chooses not to tax tort recoveries does not change the amount of
harm done by the tortfeasor nor, therefore, the amount of deterrence that is necessary.
Self-assessment seems to disturb this deterrence scheme because
a self-assessor, such as Q, will adapt to the prevailing tax laws and
self-assess at an amount less than his total taxable earnings. Society's interests will be unprotected because Q will only consider his
own needs and not the portion of his work that would have inured
to the government's benefit. R, in turn, will be underdeterred.
On the other hand, there are probably other workers who can be

122

See supra note 84.
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)-(3) (1976).
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hired to take Q's place, or other means of modifying the production process, so that society does not lose the full amount of the
victim's productive capacity. When Q, for example, misses work
because of an injury, another worker or technique can be added or
an existing input modified so that the real loss is much less than
Q's earnings. Thus, deterrence might be better served and the societal cost of an accident more accurately assigned if R is not made
to pay the full amount of Q's pre-tax earnings loss. 12 3 To the extent
that compensation of Q is a distinct goal of the law, it may well be
that Q's after-tax earnings more closely approximate the societal
loss than does his pre-tax income. Under self-assessment, potential
victims are likely to self-assess at their after-tax earnings level,
while the present system of conventional tort damages traditionally fixes awards based on victims' pre-tax earnings levels.
This is not to suggest that there is any necessary correspondence
between the government's tax bite into Q's earnings and the
amount of Q's loss upon injury that may be someone else's gain.
Rather, the point is that to the extent that Q's loss is another
party's gain, there is no net societal loss, and the traditional rule of
compensating Q for his economic loss at his full pre-tax earnings is
likely to overdeter R. As such, a self-assessed system is not necessarily inferior to an institutionally assessed one when, as is likely,
the self-assessor considers the non-taxability of a potential tort recovery. On the other hand, this feature of self-assessment that may
make the amount of deterrence more nearly optimal is not one
that requires the institution of self-assessment. After all, conventional assessors (juries) could be instructed to consider the aftertax position of the injured party.
This detour into the question of optimal deterrence and the taxability of tort recoveries demonstrates the sensitivity of self-assessment to various concerns in tort law. But this adaptability ought
not to obscure the simplicity of self-assessment. By substituting
the self-assessed amount of first-party insurance for the conventional assessment of the second half of a trial, self-assessment
would save administrative costs, compensate victims adequately
123 For a development of this theme along a different line, see W. Bishop, Economic Loss
(1981) (unpublished paper on file in the University of Virginia Law Library) (dividing economic loss in tort into categories based on the generation of social loss rather than private
loss and arguing that recovery for the latter should be denied).
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and predictably, and retain or even improve the deterrence features of the current tort system.
3.

Self-Assessment Plus Scheduled-Damages

In its reliance on self-assessment through the use of insurance
policy purchases, the simple system described above penalizes the
uninformed and, possibly, the cash-poor individual. Some individuals may never learn about the opportunity for self-assessment
and may appear to have self-assessed a zero amount. It would be
possible to continue with institutional assessments for any such injured parties if the self-assessment is below some minimum
amount. Such a rule also might be extended to protect the unfortunate party who has purchased a tiny amount of lost earnings insurance. But this approach is less than ideal. If a choice is offered
between subscribing to the self-assessment innovation, by purchasing first-party insurance, and continuing with the second half of a
trial, then there is a danger of "adverse selection." 124 For example,
individuals who are presentable as particularly sympathetic plaintiffs may seek to avoid self-assessment altogether. Moreover, given
the administrative costs and inaccuracies that inhere in institutional assessments, it is desirable to design a self-assessment system that entirely removes damage determination from the
courtroom.
It is suggested, therefore, that in the absence of a self-assessed
damage amount, the system rely on an announced schedule of
damages similar to that used in Workmen's Compensation systems.2 5 This schedule might set an amount such as $15,000 per
year as the "statutory amount" for determining the earnings component of tort damages. Thus, if in a suit against R, Q is unable to
produce evidence of a prior self-assessment, the court would award
$15,000 for each of the two years of recuperation and discount appropriately. If Q is expected to miss but a few days of work, then
the statutory amount would be pro-rated.
124 See generally Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. Econ. 44 (1974).
125 See, e.g., Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1976);

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50

(1976); N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 15-16 (McKinney 1964). See also A. Millus
& W. Gentile, Workers' Compensation Law and Insurance 155-205 (1976) (discussing benefits under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law).
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The suggested statutory amount is, of course, arbitrary. The
$15,000 amount may, in fact, seem far too generous a minimum,
considering its nontaxability to Q. On the other hand, this high
minimum guarantee may serve as a concrete display of the administrative cost savings that are available in the absence of institutionalized assessments. A generous statutory amount is also indicated by the plight of an injured party who has had little chance to
self-assess. For example, the tort victim who recently has disembarked in the jurisdiction or country' would at least recover
the statutory amount.
The award of this statutory amount is not, of course, part of a
no-fault system but only follows a determination of the tortfeasor's
liability in the first half of the trial. The deterrence function of the
tort system thus is preserved. Theoretically, deterrence regards potential tortfeasors as sensitive and responsive to cost-benefit calculations. From this perspective, it would be desirable for the statutory amount to equal the average lost-earning capacity of the
population that does not self-assess minus the pure wealth transfer
component. 2 7 That is, tortfeasors might be as well deterred as
they are in the conventional tort system by a self-assessed system
in which the tortfeasor is required to pay either the victim's selfassessed amount or, for those victims who do not self-assess, the
average loss for the group of uninsured potential victims. 28 There
126 The system also could allow residents of jurisdictions with no self-assessment system
to introduce evidence of insurance policies held in their resident state or country. Thus,
nonresidents need not be excluded from self-assessment.
Alternatively, the system could lower the statutory amount for non-assessing residents to
conform to their average lost earnings and offer a higher statutory amount for nonresidents
to match their average damages. The latter group's average is likely to be higher because it
includes individuals with relatively high earning capacities who would have self-assessed
had they been residents.
127 See supra note 123.
128 In other words, potential tortfeasors are deterred not by the actual costs in their indi-

vidual cases, but rather by the expected costs of probabilistic outcomes viewed prospectively. The scheduled damages therefore can be adjusted to match the deterrence effect of
the traditional tort system. Assume, for example, that 50% of the pedestrian population is
entitled to $40,000 per year for lost earning capacity, 25% to $20,000, and 25% to $6,000. In
the traditional tort system, the tortfeasor who injures a pedestrian can expect to pay
$26,500, assuming a one year recuperation period. That is, 0.5 x ($40,000) + 0.25 x
($20,0000) + 0.25 x ($6,000) = $26,500. A self-assessed system that covers the same population can offer the same amount of deterrence. If only the $40,000 earners self-assess, then
the statutory amount ought to be set at $13,000 and the tortfeasor will expect to pay 0.5 x
(40,000) + 0.5 x ($13,000) = $26,500. If, on average, one half of the $20,000 earners decide
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is some danger, then, that if the statutory amount is greater than
the average earning capacity of the uninsured and unassessed population, potential tortfeasors will be overdeterred. On the other
hand, any statutory amount that is much lower than $15,000 is
likely to generate opposition to self-assessment for tort damages.
Despite the tension it engenders between adequacy of award and
overdeterrence, the proposed system can be regarded as second
best because it seeks to avoid the expenses of institutional assessments, does not underdeter tortfeasors, and is generous enough to
meet the criticism that it is inequitable to the uninsured and
uninformed.
A second objection to overgenerous scheduled damages concerns
the problem of moral hazard, or more specifically, malingering. If
an injured party can expect to be financially better off while recuperating than while working, there is a danger that the recuperation period will be self-extended. Even more malingering can be
expected if the injured person is not satisfied by his work. To the
extent that the damage award is determined before the opportunity to malinger arises, and is then paid in lump sum fashion, there
is no incentive to malinger because the injured party's finances can
only be improved by his returning to work. Court calendars, however, are such that there is a pre-trial period and, therefore, a real
moral hazard. Although malingering is a problem associated with
virtually all tort and insurance systems, generous statutory
amounts may exacerbate the hazard. 1 9 Furthermore, if the statu-

to spend premium dollars and self-assess, then the statutory amount ought to be set at
$10,667. The tortfeasor will expect to pay 0.5 x (40,000) + 0.125 x ($20,000) + 0.375 x
($10,667) = $26,500. In sum, we can alter the statutory amount-to protect the deterrence
feature of tort law-as the average income of the uninsured, i.e., not self-assessed, population changes.
12, Malingering presents a particularly acute problem in the context of partial employment loss, where the injured party is able to work but only at a less strenous job than the
one he held before his injury. The victim may prefer to insist on his total disability rather
than undertake rehabilitation that leads to such partial re-employment. The insurance and
tort systems probably should allow the victim to recover the full amount of his employment
loss (and assume no partial employment), but have the insurance contract provide 50 cents
of recovery for each dollar that is earned after rehabilitation. This would avoid the disincentive created by the current rule by withholding a dollar of insurance for each dollar earned.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
In the traditional tort system, such an antimalingering technique would lead to the
overdeterrence of potential tortfeasors, because the ability of the plaintiff to work-albeit at
a new job-would no longer be a defense that would mitigate damages. Yet if this rule is
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tory amount is too generous, a different moral hazard results, because some people may take
too many risks and tend to be in130
accidents.
more
in
volved
It is interesting to note that the substantive rules in the trial's
first half may affect the behavior of potential malingerers. An injured party who faces a tort trial in the foreseeable future will be
less inclined to malinger, the lower the probability of victory on
the issue of liability. After all, if the defendant is frequently freed
from liability, the plaintiff will not risk unnecessary medical expenses and periods of unemployment. Other things being equal
then, a rule of liability that hinges on negligence may be superior
to a rule of strict liability""1 to the extent that plaintiffs are more
assured of winning under the latter rule. Of course, other things
are not equal, and a legal rule that requires a determination of
negligence or relative negligence is apt to consume more resources
in the first half of each trial than is one that assigns liability more
strictly. Still, the point is that malingering may be exacerbated by
the certainty of liability.
It could be argued that because deterrence depends on the
tortfeasor's average or expected payout in the event of injury, selfassessment is unnecessary and scheduled damages should serve as
the sole determinant of compensation. If the statutory amount can
be set at the level that corresponds to the average earnings of the
entire population, then tortfeasors can be optimally deterred and
the costs of institutional assessments avoided without resort to a
system of self-assessment. The administrative costs associated with
the additional purchases of first-party insurance, generated by
self-assessment, would also be saved. Yet a system that preserves
the self-assessment option is plainly superior to this suggestion. To
the extent that compensation is a goal of the tort system, self-assessment allows individuals who foresee the inadequacy of the
scheduled amount in the event of their own injury to be compensated fully. Put in a more political way, the proposed system of
self-assessment is meant to save administrative costs and leave evapplied in a self-assessment system, potential victims will underassess, because they will
count on 150% recoveries if they receive both insurance and wage funds. As a result, the
deterrence level may be nearly optimal.
130 The same moral hazard is present in the choice of a rule governing collateral sources in
tort recovery. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
131 See generally Demsetz, supra note 120, at 13; Posner, supra note 120, at 29.
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eryone at least as well off as under the conventional system. To
many people the statutory amount will appear generous. To those
who view the schedule as inadequate, self-assessment is available.
Finally, it might be argued that the statutory amount ought to
be more generous, despite the problems of overdeterrence and malingering. This is because some potential victims would honestly
self-assess at a level above the statutory amount but might not be
able to do so because they cannot afford the necessary premiums.
Although these troubling cases may persist, insurance companies
have incentives to correct these underassessment problems, which
stem from imperfections in the capital market. Much as credit
cards are now offered to cash-poor students, an insurance company
might offer to sell first-party lost-earnings insurance-with a marketing reminder that the amount of such insurance can serve as
the determinant of damages in the event of a third-party liability-for premiums that are largely payable, with interest, in later
years.
4. Self-Assessment in Wrongful Death Actions
The use of self-assessed damages in wrongful death suits is perhaps the simplest and most convincing of all the applications of
the self-assessment principle to tort law. The emphasis on lost
earning capacity as a model for self-assessment largely derives
from the enormous difficulty of assessing this capacity institutionally. The accuracy of self-assessment-as opposed to its cost-saving feature-is most impressive, however, when use is made of the
link between recovery for a fatal accident and the amount of lifeinsurance coverage previously purchased on the deceased victim's
life. If R's tortious act kills Q, then the self-assessment principle
can avoid the pitfalls of calculating lost earning capacity, consumption tendencies, and other necessary components of an institutional assessment. In fact, the process of discounting to present
value can be avoided because Q purchased his life insurance with
the knowledge that its benefits would be paid in a lump sum.
Thus, the life insurance owned by Q's family 3 2 is a remarkably
13'There is room for debate about which life insurance policies ought to be used in the
self-assessment process. The discussion in the text assumes that the family unit is an intimate and amicable one so that policies held by Q's family on the life of Q can be summed (if
more than one policy exists) to yield the appropriate tort recovery for Q's survivors. Insura-
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appropriate proxy for assessing R's liability to those who suffer loss
from Q's death. This is especially true because life insurance is
widely and aggressively marketed. The methods that are used for
calculating the amount of life insurance coverage needed by a family are, of course, no more than methods of self-assessment. If Q or
Q's family did not purchase life insurance or purchased only a
small amount of such protection, the system would again provide
for a statutory amount. 133
If self-assessment is extended beyond lost earnings to include
wrongful death actions or other components of tort damages, the
scheme is complicated by the need for a "priority system." Consider, for example, the case in which R pushes T down the stairs
and T is killed. T was 45 years old and worked in an industry with
a mandatory retirement age of 65. There is no necessary reason
why T's life insurance coverage should match the discounted present value of his first-party lost-earnings insurance extrapolated
over the twenty-year period of lost employment. Thus, if T carried
a large amount of lost-earnings insurance, the amount over twenty
years (properly discounted) may greatly exceed either the amount
of T's life insurance or the statutory amount of life insurance if T
owns no qualifying life insurance. T's survivors will insist that they
should be left at least as well off as they would have been if R's
action had merely deprived T of twenty working years. With difble interests, however, do not always coincide with rights to recover for wrongful death. For
example, a corporation may purchase "key man life insurance" to protect itself against the
extraordinary costs it would encounter were a key executive to die. (Although it may also
encounter these costs if the executive retires, the obvious moral hazard normally precludes
the sale of such all-inclusive retirement insurance.) Yet it is unlikely that the corporation
could recover from a tortfeasor who caused the death of this executive. This issue does not
detract from the usefulness of self-assessment and can be settled, in large part, by legislative
action.
There is also the question of whether "term" or "ordinary" life insurance provides the
best self-assessment proxy. The latter carries with it more administrative costs, but because
it incorporates a savings feature, ordinary life insurance may reflect more accurately the
anticipated needs of the insured's family.
133 The notion of a limitation on damages for wrongful death is not, of course, a novel
one. See generally Speiser, supra note 108, §§ 7:1-7:6. Note, however, that the statutory
amount in a self-assessment system-unlike its present counterpart-is not merely a limitation, but a fixed amount. Of course, a very low ceiling on damages as currently assessed may
be one that virtually every plaintiff can prove and might, therefore, be the equivalent of a
fixed statutory amount. In both systems, the scheduled limitations often win lead to settlements somewhat below the indicated amounts, because parties will consider the costs of
litigation.
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ferent facts, of course, the family can be expected to point to the
amount of life insurance coverage as the proper self-assessed value.
As a practical matter, the amount of life insurance is likely to be
a better assessment than the amount derived from the lost-earnings coverage. The latter may be higher because it was purchased
with the assumption that T's own consumption needs would have
to be financed out of the recovery. It must be clear in advance,
however, which of a variety of self-assessments or statutory
amounts will prevail in the determination of damages. For the reason just discussed-and because life insurance is so widely marketed-it is proposed that in the event of death, self-assessment
depend on the amount of life insurance coverage or, in the absence
of such insurance, the statutory amount of life insurance.
5.

Tendencies Toward Overassessment

There may be a bias toward overassessment inherent in the
choice of first-party insurance as the proxy for self-assessment.
Such a bias would, among other things, lead to an overdeterrence
of potential tortfeasors because recoveries would exceed actual
losses. Each dollar that is used to pay a first-party insurance premium buys not only some first-party insurance to cover accidental
injuries to Q, but also an equivalent amount of potential tort recovery. Yet, this tort recovery will actually be borne not by the
insurer, but by a tortfeasor, so that the premium charged by the
insurer will be "low" in the sense that it will not include the likelihood of compensable tortious acts. Essentially, the insured buys
two elements of coverage, but the insurer need only plan to pay
one of those elements in setting its premiums. Therefore, the selfassessing insured party might purchase more first-party insurance
than he would have in the absence of a self-assessment system.
Fortunately, this tendency toward overassessment is counteracted by two factors. Insurance premiums must cover not only the
expected value of recoveries but also the administrative costs and
profit margins of insurance companies. Because these costs are
substantial, the insured tends in the first instance to purchase less
first-party insurance than he really judges to be his need. As long
as these administrative costs are not trivial, the dangers of overassessment within a self-assessment system are not worrisome. In addition, because the number of injuries that lead to recoveries from
tortfeasors is relatively small compared to the number of injuries
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covered by first-party insurance,"' self-assessors would have to
pay high premiums (that cover administrative costs) to gain a
small expected value in potential tort recoveries.
Another danger of overassessment derives from the moral hazard
that can be generated by insurance. Because it "takes two to
tort,' 13 5 and liability rules imperfectly reflect the principle of comparative negligence, 3 6 there may be a danger that some people will
overassess, hoping to prosper from an injury. Even if comparative
negligence rules are brilliantly structured, there may be a tendency
toward the moral hazard of increased involvement in accidents by
individuals who hope to collect on a grand scale from multiple
post-accident recoveries. Fortunately, the insurance market itself
can be expected to deal with this problem. The graver the moral
hazard the more likely that insurers will not sell insurance to applicants who seek to purchase amounts of insurance that far exceed their present or expected earnings. This ability of insurers to
refuse to sell first-party insurance at first appears to defeat the
goal of self-assessment. As seen earlier, an honest self-assessor may
need compensation beyond the amount of his current earnings. Insurers, however, are perfectly able to compete for this honest selfassessor's business while remaining alert to the dangers of "optimistic" self-assessors when a substantial moral hazard is posed. It
ought to be noted that, at the present time, some first-party lostearnings insurance-in the event of hospitalization, for exam37
ple-is offered regardless of the applicant's actual earnings.
The ability of the insurance market to protect against moral
hazards and the importance of premium costs to counterbalance
overassessment tendencies raise the nasty problem of the use of
low-cost insurance as a quick self-assessment device. Although it is
134

In addition to the fact that some injuries are self-inflicted or result from acts of God,

some tortfeasors are judgment proof or unidentifiable. For some evidence of the extent of
unrecoverable losses, see J. O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 176-78 (1979), and sources cited
therein.
135 See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Of course,
one can be injured in the absence of a tortfeasor so that, in general, a moral hazard exists in
the presence of insurance. This moral hazard, however, is unrelated to the present proposal
for the tort system and therefore is left to the insurance literature.
136 See R. Posner, supra note 57, § 6.3 (noting that the doctrine of contributory negligence
often leads to suboptimal deterrence and that in some cases comparative negligence also is
not the correct economic standard).
"I Small amounts of such insurance are regularly advertised in the mass media.
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true that, in general, premium costs and the discretion of the insurer will assure the reliability of first-party coverage as a proxy
for self-assessed damages, there are some types of insurance that
can be purchased at very lost cost and for very high amounts of
coverage. For example, an insurer may be willing to sell a sizable
flight insurance policy at a premium cost of a few dollars because,
although it has no opportunity to investigate S's earnings, needs,
or past, the moral hazard is low. The insurer can pool the risks
that are posed by thousands of airplane trips and be confident that
few of its customers are interested in killing themselves and fellow
passengers in order to leave their beneficiaries with a handsome
sum. Moreover, airline security devices, such as bomb detectors,
will help eliminate most of the moral hazard generated by the willingness to "overinsure."
If a self-assessment system regards flight insurance as a generally applicable self-assessed amount, however, S's recovery is not
limited to airline mishaps. S could conceivably purchase flight insurance and then drive a bit more recklessly or take up scuba diving and hang gliding while on his vacation. In short, if S's survivors
can point to inexpensive flight insurance as a proxy for wrongful
death, there will be an increased moral-hazard problem and a substantial tendency toward overassessment. This overassessment tendency is also present in situations unaccompanied by moral hazard. For example, a patient about to undergo surgery that presents
a substantial chance of a malpractice suit may be encouraged by
the self-assessment system to purchase some short-term life insurance or lost-earnings insurance, to the extent that insurers will sell
the latter type of policy. In sum, the tendency toward overassessment is problematic when self-assessment at a high level is availa13 8
ble at a low cost.
It is necessary, then, to modify the self-assessment system that
has been described and only accept self-assessments that were obtained at some minimum cost or that covered some minimum period of time. For example, the statutory amount would apply unless first-party insurance for a larger amount had been in effect for
more than one year, or unless unrefundable premiums of more
than $100 had been paid. The details of this modification remain
"' An overgenerous statutory amount presents problems of a similar nature. See supra
note 129 and accompanying text.
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to be worked out and adjusted, but the general need for such a
13 9
protective device is clear.
D. Self-Assessment and the CollateralSource Rule
The role of the insurer within the self-assessment system thus
far has been a passive one. The insurer happens to sell the firstparty lost-earnings or life insurance that provides the opportunity
for bounded self-assessment. Although this subsection will propose
that the insurer play a somewhat more active role in the system,
this modification is not a necessary one. As an illustration, if the
insurer pays Q when Q falls down his own stairs and R pays Q the
same amount when R is found liable for pushing Q down the stairs,
the system operates as promised; administrative costs are saved
and deterrence features are preserved, if not improved.
The relationships among the tortfeasor R, the insured injured
party Q, and the insurer are somewhat uneasy in this "pure" system, and depend on whether the jurisdiction subscribes to the collateral source rule. If it does, then the victim's insurance coverage
normally will not affect the amount of his recovery. 140 Q will collect
from the insurer alone when he falls down his own stairs and from
both R and the insurer when R is found liable for Q's fall. Commentators argue that Q's "double recovery" is justified because Q
has been paying premiums all along and therefore is independently
entitled to the insurance recovery that is now available.14 1 This ra"0 One simple solution to the problem of inexpensive overassessment might be to require
state insurance administrators to approve policies in advance of their being marketed for

their self-assessment feature. Courts, in determining damages, could consider unapproved
policies, but only those similar in character to approved policies would be presumptively
applicable. Other questions requiring interpretive rulemaking could be referred by statute to
these administrators.
140 See Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of Subrogation Clauses in Insurance Policies,
609 Ins. L.J. 573 (1973) (noting that although subrogation is not permitted in personal injury insurance contracts, except by express contractual provision, in life insurance policies
the anti-subrogation result may not be changed even by express agreement). See also Max-

well, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 669
(1961-62); West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16
Okla. L. Rev. 395 (1963).
14 See R. Posner, supra note 57, § 6.15 (noting that premiums reflect the discounted cost

of injuries plus the cost of policy writing so that the insured should receive double recovery);
Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 313 (1964)
(arguing that private life insurance benefits, a large portion of which is a return of savings,

ordinarily should not be deducted from tort damages); James, Social Insurance and Tort
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tionalization, however, ignores the sensitivity of insurance rates: if
the collateral source rule were abandoned, premiums would decrease because the insurer would not need to dip into its own funds
when a tortfeasor is capable of paying the recovery.
There are compelling justifications for permitting the injured
party to collect from the tortfeasor despite the availability of any
insurance recovery. The tortfeasor should not be absolved from
paying for the harm he has caused merely because an injured party
has purchased insurance, either directly with premiums or indirectly by accepting lower wages in exchange for employee coverage.
In deterrence terms, the argument in favor of always extracting
full payment from the tortfeasor is the same as that discussed earlier in the context of requiring the tortfeasor to pay the pre-tax
earnings of the injured party.142 . A potential tortfeasor must face
the full cost of the harm he may cause in order to be optimally
deterred. If, instead, the goals of the tort system are optimal deterrence and full compensation, they can be accomplished without
forcing the tortfeasor to pay the full cost of the injuries he causes.
Assuming the victim's insurance provides him full compensation,
the tortfeasor could be required to pay an equivalent amount into
a public fund. Similarly, if the goal of the tort system is optimal
deterrence-and full compensation is unimportant-then negligent
actors could be fined an amount equal to the expected damage
from each negligent act, regardless of whether anyone was actually
injured. 143 Assume, however, that full compensation of tort victims
is a desirable goal and that administrative costs are saved by
avoiding the institution of government-managed pools and fines.
Thus, the system should involve only the tortfeasor, injured party,
and insurer.
A choice must be made, then, between the collateral source rule,
under which both R and the insurer will pay Q, and a system in
which R pays but the insurer does not. In the convenient terminology of Professor Conard, 1 " this article has rejected a "deduction"
approach, in which the tortfeasor would be freed from paying to
Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 537, 553 (1952) (noting

that the claimant's own thrift and foresight are justifications for allowing double recoveries).
142 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
"'

For the statement of this argument in the context of criminal deterrence, see Stigler,

The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526 (1970).
14 Conard, supra note 141, at 279.

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 825 1982

826

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 68:771

the extent that reparation is available from another source (the insurer), because it interferes with the deterrence goal of tort law.
Three other avenues are available. One is cumulation, in which insurers and tortfeasors pay their due without regard to the possibility of double recovery. A second is subrogation, which permits one
source of compensation, typically the insurer, to seek reimbursement by pursuing the insured's tort claim. The third approach, deduction, runs in the other direction 14 5 by freeing the insurer from

paying whenever the injured party, its insured, can collect from a
tortfeasor. This "deduction-by-insurer" system is a fair description
of the simplest self-assessment system described earlier.
1. Deduction by the Insurer
Although the deduction-by-insurer alternative preserves deterrence by requiring the tortfeasor to pay for the results of his actions, such an approach is somewhat awkward. In terms of the earlier illustration, if Q falls down his stairs, the insurer will
compensate him; but if R pushes Q and is found liable in the first
half of a tort trial, R will pay Q and the insurer will not. Can Q be
expected to manage the lawsuit against R effectively? If Q loses
the suit against R, Q will merely collect from the insurer. In fact,
any expenditure by Q for legal fees will probably come out of his
recovery from R, so that Q may actually prefer to lose the lawsuit!
The insurer might contractually require Q to pursue his tort claim
with vigor, but this would require a good deal of policing and
would generate litigation with all its attendant administrative
costs.
The insurer could try to design its policies to exclude accidents
that require the insured's assistance in litigation. For example, the
insurance might cover only "first-party accidents" in which the insured-and no other party-was involved. Such a narrow policy
could still serve as a self-assessment device146 but it would leave an
"' Although Canard discusses and favors an approach in which tortfeasors may deduct
insurance proceeds, excluding most private insurance, id. at 312-14, he fails to recognize the
possibility of allowing the insurer to deduct damages recovered from a tortfeasor. Of course,
an injured party would prefer the subrogation approach, or, if faced only with the choice of
deduction schemes, deduction by tortfeasor, because the insurance recovery will normally be
available soon after the accident, rather than after a delayed trial.
146 Subject, however, to a minimum premium requirement or similar device that avoids
the moral hazard associated with large amounts of coverage at low cost. See supra note 138
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injured party uncompensated in many cases. To the extent that
compensation is a goal of the tort system and a typical buyer of
insurance seeks an assurance of compensation, this narrow policy
design would be undesirable. It is difficult to imagine any device
that would encourage an insured party to pursue a claim against a
tortfeasor (who will then be optimally deterred) and yet ensure
that the claimant will always be compensated with no double
recovery.
2. Cumulation
The tension between insured and insurer that mars the deduction-by-insurer approach to parallel recoveries is not present in a
system of cumulation. Cumulation, however, which retains the collateral source rule, creates planning difficulties for the individual
who contemplates purchasing insurance, increases the moral hazard, and, in the context of self-assessment, lessens deterrence.
Planning difficulties derive from the "game" that will be played by
an individual who can only guess whether an accident that may
befall him will involve the tortious and compensable act of another
party. Q, for example, may self-assess his need for income during
recuperation at $50,000 per year. Because Q may fall down his own
stairs, he is inclined to purchase this $50,000 amount of insurance
coverage. If, however, he expects this injury to result from R's
push, under cumulation he can recover some amount from R as
damages. Under these circumstances, Q will be inclined to save
some premium money and insure himself against lost earnings for
less than $50,000. Q's precise calculation will depend on the expected probability of receiving a "recoverable" injury from a
tortfeasor and on his attitude toward risk. Most people who buy
insurance are interested in protection, however, and not in risky
calculations or windfalls. Thus, a disadvantage of cumulation and
the collateral source rule is that the decision to buy insurance is
complicated by the prospects of double recoveries.
Although this planning problem might not appear to be a serious
one, it will occur more often under a self-assessed damage system.
The use of first-party insurance as the proxy for valuation may
lead many people who have not purchased insurance in the past to

and accompanying text.
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do so if this insurance is the only way to recover more than the
statutory amount in the event of a tortious injury. Many of these
new insureds will be even less inclined to gamble and thus more
interested in predictable recoveries.
More important, the prospect of double recovery will trigger the
moral hazards discussed earlier. 14 7 Some individuals will tend toward riskier behavior so that more accidents can be expected.
There is also the post-accident moral hazard of malingering to consider. Each day of unemployment may produce a recovery that is
double that of the individual's compensation for work. Note, however, that these hazards of cumulation are unrelated to the adoption of self-assessment and are merely byproducts of the collateral
source rule.
Finally, cumulation and the collateral source rule interfere with
the ability of a self-assessed damage system to deter accidents and
tortious acts optimally. Imagine that Q predicts that he is as likely
to fall down as to be pushed down the stairs. In the event of a fall,
Q wants $50,000 of insurance coverage. If pushed, he needs only
$25,000 in insurance coverage because under the collateral source
rule he can collect the remaining $25,000 from the tortfeasor, after
pointing to his self-assessed amount. Given Q's prediction, and ignoring nonneutral risk preferences, Q may well purchase $33,333 of
insurance coverage. When Q falls, he will collect $33,333, and when
pushed, $66,666, so that on average he will still collect his goal of
$50,000. Yet R will now be underdeterred because his liability will
match Q's self-assessed amount of $33,333 although he causes
$50,000 of harm. Plainly, as Q underassesses in response to cumulation, R is underdeterred.
3.

Subrogation

Subrogation overcomes the weaknesses of the cumulation and
deduction approaches to overlapping recoveries. Subrogation always permits the insured party to collect from his insurer and the
insurer can, in turn, collect from the tortfeasor. Some insurance
contracts already provide for subrogation, and this practice is not
considered contrary to public policy. 148 The self-assessment propoSee supra notes 129-30, 135-38 and accompanying text.
See generally R. Keeton, supra note 63, § 3.10 (noting that property insurance policies
commonly include subrogation clauses but that life and accident policies do not). See also
"4

148
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sal would require subrogation for all insurance contracts that could
be used for self-assessment. Planning would be straightforward because double recoveries would be eliminated. Deterrence would be
well served because an insured would not be inclined to
underassess.
Conceptually, if subrogation is adopted, the insurance company
can be regarded as an insurer for nontortious injuries and as a conduit and collector in recoveries from tortfeasors. From a compensation perspective, this aspect of the system is desirable because the
injured party will recover soon after the accident. Moreover, if the
tortfeasor carries liability insurance, subrogation may reduce administrative costs because insurance companies are experienced
negotiators capable of disposing of claims between one another
rapidly. 149 Similarly, subrogation responds in part to the plight of
of cash and apt to be
an injured party who is often in great need
150
pressured into an unfavorable settlement.
In a system without subrogation, the injured party must bargain
directly with the tortfeasor or his insurer, either one of whom can
begin the bargaining with an insistence on no liability at all even if
the injury is undisputed. By contrast, under the proposed system,
the injured party deals with his own insurer. Although he is still
subject to negotiating pressure-concerning the expected length of
the recuperation period, for example-there is less room for
disagreement.
E.

Extensions to Other Components of Tort Damages

Although the basic self-assessment system is a desirable substitute for conventional damages determinations in suits involving
loss of life or earning capacity, it cannot be extended uncritically

Note, Insurance Subrogation in Personal Injury Torts, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 621 (1978) (commenting upon expansion of the permissible scope of subrogation to include medical payments under an automobile insurance policy).
Subrogation, like the cumulation and deduction schemes, presents post-accident moral
hazards. A comparison of these hazards, however, is left to another effort. This article emphasizes only that, among the obvious alternatives to cumulation, subrogation is relatively
attractive for the purposes of the self-assessment proposal.
'4' For a statement of this argument in the context of social insurance and tort liability in
general, see James, supra note 141, at 561 (arguing that subrogation between enterprises
often will cancel out in the long run).
1580
See generally H. Ross, Settled Out of Court 140 (1980).
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to other areas of tort damages. Tort law permits recovery for losses
resulting from medical expenses, nonphysical harms (such as injury to reputation), pain and suffering, and property damage. The
following discussion considers whether self-assessment can be extended to these areas.
1.

Medical Expenses

Self-assessment has little or no role to play in the determination
of compensable medical expenses. Typically, these expenses either
have been incurred or can be easily predicted at the time of trial.
Even in cases where the severity of injuries is difficult to predict
until well after the trial has ended, there is no reason to expect
these costs to be susceptible to self-assessment. Self-assessment
makes sense, recall, when losses depend on personal factors more
accurately evaluated by the intimately involved individual than by
strangers entrusted with the process of institutional assessment.
The expense of proper medical treatment does not depend on personal tastes or aspirations. 151 As such, the determination of this
component of tort damages should be left to conventional assessment by judges and juries, aided by expert testimony. If there is
room for improvement in this area, it is in removing this determination from the package that is included in the lump sum award
that the tortfeasor pays after trial and, instead, guaranteeing these
payments to some extent by paying the injured party over time, as
15 2
the medical expenses are incurred.
2. Nonphysical Torts
Self-assessment similarly offers little promise for damage that
results from injuries to reputation, invasions of privacy, emotional
harm, and other nonphysical torts. More often than not, the identity of the tortfeasor, location of the tortious act, or circumstances
surrounding the injury will determine the extent of the harm. Al5 Of course, some individuals will value an expensive private hospital room more than
the average person; in other words, idiosyncratic tastes are not absent in the field of

medicine. Furthermore, there are certainly those who know that their own medical histories
predict a more-expensive-than-average recovery. As a gross generalization, however, it is fair
to conclude that medical expenses are routinely and uniformly assessed in tort trials today,
so that self-assessment can work little improvement in this area.
152 See supra note 74.
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though these harms are related to personal tastes, unlike medical
needs, potential victims are unlikely to be able to specify in advance the variety of potential injuries and the internal valuation of
their resulting damages. Moreover, even if an individual can predict the nature of a nonphysical tort and self-assess the value of
the interest that might be violated, insurers will shy away from
providing the coverage that serves as the proxy for self-assessment
because of the substantial moral hazard involved. For example,
self-assessment may appear quite appropriate for the damage
caused by a tortious disclosure of an embarrassing fact, and institutional assessment of damages is likely to be quite speculative.
Nonetheless, an insurer can hardly offer coverage to the potential
victim. Apart from the guesswork involved in setting premiums, it
is difficult for the insurer to know whether the "fact" is really embarrassing to the insured. If it is not, the insured easily can arrange
for the fact to be divulged in order to obtain a tax-free insurance
recovery. Thus, the potential for self-assessment for nonphysical
torts is, at best, limited and can be safely put aside.
3. Pain and Suffering
The proper treatment of losses from pain and suffering under a
self-assessment system is problematic. Consider the case of U, a
teacher, who loses a limb while using a product defectively manufactured by V. U's medical expenses, including the costs of postoperative care, are relatively simple to calculate and will be paid
by V. 1 13 If U's injury does not interfere with his teaching career
and the recuperation period is short or coincides with a vacation,
V's liability will be quite small.
Conventional assessments avoid this result by considering "pain
and suffering" as a component of plaintiff's damages to be monetized. Self-assessment could be limited to the uses already described and juries could still be asked to attach a value to pain and
suffering in the second half of a tort trial. Unlike lost earning ca153 Note that if U also carries first-party health insurance, there will be the question of a
double recovery and the status of the collateral source rule. Since medical expenses are not
to be determined by self-assessment, the deterrence of V is not affected by the amount of
U's insurance-but considerations of planning simplicity and moral hazard still indicate the
superiority of subrogation over cumulation. See supra text accompanying note 147. Note,
however, that this choice of approaches is not related to the self-assessment system and
therefore may be passed over.
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pacity, for example, it can hardly be argued that pain and suffering
is more accurately assessed by a victim beforehand than by an impartial assessor, such as a jury, after the injury. It would be hopeless to expect honest self-assessment after the injury, although the
potential for accuracy is then present.
On the other hand, conventional jury assessments of pain and
suffering are highly speculative and of dubious consistency and accuracy. These flaws undermine the goals of optimal deterrence and
fair compensation. Moreover, there are substantial costs involved
in these speculative assessments because juries must listen to witnesses and deliberate. It may be appropriate, then, to refuse to
compensate a victim's pain and suffering. Predictably, self-assessors will add to their assessments of lost earning capacity an
amount meant to cover the expected pain and suffering from an
injury of given severity. After all, pain and suffering will normally
be correlated with the length of recuperation and unemployment.
This approach is similar to proposed no-fault systems in which the
injured party collects only from his own insurer. Because the goal
of no-fault is to avoid litigation, pain and suffering are ignored or
considered to be included in medical expenses or other easily monetized components of compensation.1 5
This "wishing away" of pain and suffering may be perfectly acceptable in return for a system that promises lower administrative
costs and surer compensation. Indeed, self-assessment, like nofault, can deal with particularly outrageous cases, such as the
teacher's loss of a limb but no work time, by removing them from
the proposed system and allowing conventional assessment to continue. 1 5 The system, however, can save additional administrative
154 Keeton and O'Connell conclude that: (1) The basic, compulsory no-fault coverage
should not include compensation for pain and suffering; (2) Individuals should be free to
buy such coverage from insurers; (3) In less serious injuries, despite the lack of coverage by
the basic plan, injured parties should be unable to sue for their pain and suffering; and (4)
Traditional tort suits should continue for the more severe cases so that awards for pain and
suffering as well as for economic loss will continue. See R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra
note 52, at 360-61. See also Calabresi, The New York Plan: A Free Choice Modification, 71
Colum. L. Rev. 267, 268 n.6 (1971) (noting the impracticality of scheduled damages for pain
and suffering, but suggesting that first-party insurance be tied to a fixed percentage of medical bills through which purchasers could "value their own propensity for pain and suffering"). Although these authorities' viewpoints are objectionable, the point is that the removal
of pain and suffering from the calculus of tort damages is not by itself a novel idea.
155 See, e.g., R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 52, at 323-24.
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costs by assigning statutory amounts to specific losses that cause
pain and suffering. Statutory amounts should be assigned to losses
that are unrelated or only loosely related in magnitude to lost
earning capacity, thereby forcing self-assessment of pain and suffering wherever feasible.
For example, legislation could declare that a lost limb is the
equivalent of x years of earning capacity or that each year without
the use of a limb would generate a recovery equal to one-half of
that year's earning capacity. In either case, "earning capacity" refers to the statutory amount or the self-assessed amount, whichever is greater. By way of illustration, assume that U, in the earlier
example, had self-assessed his lost earnings at $20,000 a year by
purchasing that amount of first-party coverage. Because he has
lost the use of a limb (as a result of a tort) and yet lost no work
time, under the first approach he would recover medical expenses
and $20,000 times x, regardless of his age.158 The second approach
considers pain and suffering as a yearly loss and would award medical expenses and $10,000 times the number of years he is expected
to remain alive, according to the relevant mortality table. This second approach offers the advantage of dealing with temporary
losses. Thus, if with rehabilitation the injured teacher is expected
to regain the use of the limb in two years, the award would include
medical and rehabilitation expenses and $10,000 times two, properly discounted to present value.
It is arbitrary and dehumanizing to reduce human suffering to
scheduled amounts. Many questions are left open, only some of
which are solved by longer schedules and frner descriptions of the
horrors that befall victims. Nonetheless, conventional institutional
assessments are every bit as arbitrary and surreal. There is thus
much to recommend a system that saves trial time and other costs
and, in some sense, allows resources to go to victims or other societal needs rather than to lawyers and other similar purveyors of
costly transactions.
4.

Property Damage

In the determination of property damages, self-assessment
would be an accurate valuation method whenever the property
156 The legislation may or may not require discounting to present value.
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owner has purchased insurance. Thus, if W buys $100,000 of fire
insurance coverage on his property and Y's tortious act destroys
the property, the second half of the trial could be avoided by I's
paying the insured amount to W or, if subrogation is adopted, to
W's insurer. 15 7 Alternatively, if a self-assessed or competitively-assessed property tax were in place, the tort system could easily piggyback on this other self-assessment system. Most tortious acts
that destroy real property, however, damage parts of buildings
rather than entire structures and, more important, devalue the
buildings but not the underlying land. 158 The self-assessments
noted above, of course, represent valuations of the entire property.
Still, self-assessment will be useful in some cases and will represent
a ceiling or starting point in others.
Self-assessment is of little importance in the determination of
property damage, however, because conventional institutional assessment is already straightforward and does not generate great
administrative costs. In fact, the courtroom process of evaluating
property damages by way of repair costs and other data is likely to
be identical with the process used by an insurer to decide how
much coverage to offer. To the extent that insurance would not be
purchased and a self-assessed property damage system would rely
on schedules, these schedules would be no better and no worse
than those offered in the courtroom in a conventional assessment.
The failure of self-assessment when applied to property damage
can be traced to the issue of idiosyncratic tastes and intentions
that figured so prominently in the discussions of assessments for
property taxation and lost earning capacity compensation.' 5 9 In
those areas, the individual's personal tastes are taken quite seriously because some sources of value and happiness, such as good
neighbors, breathtaking views, and two healthy years of life, are
not easily reproduced in the marketplace. On the other hand, a car
157 In fact, given the widespread use of "coinsurance" clauses in property insurance contracts, such assessments of property loss are apt to be more accurate than those contained
in life insurance policies in the event of loss of life. For an explanation of how coinsurance
operates, see R. Keeton, supra note 63, at § 3.7.
158 The problem is analogous to appraisal difficulties that would arise in a property tax
system limited to sites (rather than sites plus structures). Such a narrow tax base might
eliminate the bias against improvements that is thought to mar the present property tax
system. See D. Netzer, supra note 9, at 197-212; Mills, The Non-Neutrality of Land Value
Taxation, 34 Nat'l Tax J. 125 (1981).
I" See supra notes 34-38, 93-96 and accompanying text.
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or bicycle that is tortiously damaged is more likely to be valued
identically by the owner and an institutional assessor because it is
easily reproduced and rarely the subject of idiosyncratic tastes or
attachments. Similarly, a damaged piece of a house, as opposed to
an entire property, is likely to be replaceable without permanent
injury to personal tastes.
In any event, a self-assessment system for smaller pieces of
property is too difficult to manage. Insurers will not offer $20,000
of coverage for a $5,000 automobile because the moral hazard is
too substantial. The system theoretically could turn to "forcing
buyers," 160 but the complications and volume of transactions that
would be involved hardly seem worthwhile in light of the marginal
advantage that such an option might offer over conventional assessment. Moreover, to some extent idiosyncratic property valuations in excess of market value are reflected in the result in the
first half of the tort trial by comparative negligence and similar
principles. The more W values his vase or bicycle at an amount in
excess of that which would be determined in a conventional assessment, the higher is W's duty of care, and the more likely W is to
have been negligent in a situation in which Y's actions damage
these items. Thus, honest self-assessors will rarely declare a valuation markedly in excess of market value and still be able to collect
the entire self-assessed amount from a tortfeasor.
F. Self-Assessment Versus No-Fault
Self-assessment is not nearly so brave a concept as no-fault,
which eliminates the first half of the tort trial and, to the extent
that insurers pay out scheduled amounts that are not easily disputed, the second half as well. Most no-fault systems do leave
some large claims to conventional liability determination and damage assessment. 11 Essentially, then, the conventional tort system is
left in place but with large "deductibles." No-fault treatment is
accorded to claims that fall within the deductible amount.
The proposed system of self-assessment does not replace the
first half of the tort trial, and rules governing liability determination would remain to deter undesirable behavior. Self-assessment
160
See

supra text accompanying notes 28-40.

"I See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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does eliminate, however, most of the second half of the trial by
relying on controlled valuations by the injured party. Because
some individuals will not self-assess and some components of damage are needed to fulfill compensation and deterrence goals but are
not easily self-assessed, the system provides for limited scheduled
compensation. Thus, some of the damage determination in this
self-assessment system is similar in method and in cost-saving to
the scheduled approach of a no-fault insurer.
Critics charge that no-fault laws impermissibly legislate unconstitutional takings. 162 They argue that an injured individual has a
property right in his claim against the injurer and that the state
cannot force him to deal with his own insurer and, perhaps, bear
the brunt of resulting insurance premium increases. This argument, though weak, is even less convincing when aimed at self-assessment systems because the injured party does collect, albeit indirectly, from the tortfeasor. The injured party loses his claim only
to the extent of his own failure to assess properly or to the extent
that scheduled damages do not provide sufficient compensation for
pain and suffering that otherwise cannot be self-assessed. In any
event, the constitutional attack on no-fault has been unsuccessful 63 and thus should pose little threat to self-assessment.
The strongest argument for no-fault rests on the institutional reality of widespread insurance coverage. When the tortfeasor has
liability insurance and the injured party is also insured, the cases
really involve insurer against insurer and it is often difficult to imagine that the real actors are responding to the deterrent effect of
162

See generally R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 52, at 504-14 (noting that some

state constitutions expressly forbid any law limiting the amount recoverable for personal
injuries and death); Dept. of Transp., Constitutional Problems In Automobile Compensation
Reform (1970) (discussing various constitutional objections and concluding that, for the
most part, state legislation of no-fault plans is unlikely to violate the Constitution).
163 See, e.g., Cyr v. Farias, 367 Mass. 720, 327 N.E.2d 890 (1975) (holding that no-fault
provision, barring recovery for pain and suffering unless reasonable and necesary medical
expenses exceed $500, did not violate constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection); Rybeck v. Rybeck, 141 N.J. Super. 481, 358 A.2d 828 (1976) (upholding New Jersey
Automobile Reparations Reform Act against claimed violations of due process, equal protection, and rights of access to the courts and trial by jury); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d
41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) (holding that New York's Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act does not violate due process, equal protection, or the
right to trial by jury). But see Murray v. Ferris, 74 Mich. App. 91, 253 N.W.2d 365 (1977)
(striking down on equal protection and due process grounds a no-fault scheme creating a
class of persons limited in their right to sue for damages).
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liability rules. If deterrence is unimportant or is substantially diluted by the cushion of liability insurance, then there is no reason
to absorb the costs of liability determination in the first half of
tort trials. No-fault systems then are attractive in their ability to
avoid these costs while continuing to spread risks.
On the other hand, to the extent that insurance premiums do
reflect the tortious history of the insured, the existence of liability
insurance does not contradict the deterrence features of the tort
system. Ours is a world with some premium responsiveness, some
uninsured actors, some insurance policies with substantial "deductibles" that serve to deter the careless or tortious, and some
uncertainty. It is therefore difficult to assess the strength of the
tort system's power to deter. Further research in this area is
needed. Meanwhile, the important comparison between self-assessment and no-fault is the obvious one: self-assessment systems seek
to offer the cost savings and simplicity of no-fault without sacrificing the ability of tort law to deter accidents.
III.

SELF-ASSESSED STOCK VALUATION

A.

The Case of Two Shareholders

Valuation problems are at the core of many issues in corporate
law. 16 4 The special treatment of closely held corporations, as contrasted to that accorded more publicly owned corporations, is
largely due to the absence of an active market in the shares of
close corporations.'6 5 Unexpected organic changes and internal disagreements often require an appraisal of a close corporation's securities. 66 In the absence of a well-defined market value, such an
appraisal is often an impossible task because the underlying corpo164

See V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance 1-2 (2d

ed. 1979).
' The close corporation has been described as a "chartered partnership." For a discussion of some of the unique aspects of the close corporation, see W. Cary & M. Eisenberg,
Cases And Materials On Corporations 18-19 (5th ed. unabridged 1980). See also Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining
Close Corporation Problem, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1-6 (1977).
166 The enterprise may evolve so that the relative importance of the various owner-employees changes over time. Similarly, personal relations among the shareholders may become strained. An interest in the enterprise may have passed to an heir who is not compatible with the owners. Finally, one shareholder may simply want to abandon the joint effort.
See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 165, at 3.
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rate assets are themselves difficult to value and future earnings
hard to predict. Given the substantial literature on the difficulty of
appraisals in this area, a review of the various appraisal techniques
167
and their shortcomings is unnecessary.

Because the structure of this assessment problem closely resembles that encountered in the allocation of the property tax burden,
it is no surprise to observe primitive self-assessment procedures in
corporate stock valuations that are remarkably similar to those discussed earlier in this essay."" 8 Consider the relatively simple and
common problem that arises when two partners, Z and A, find
themselves in fundamental disagreement over business policy and
wish to part company. A court may or may not supervise the division. Certainly, it is possible to avoid any assessment problems by
selling the entire business to an outsider and dividing the sale proceeds between the two owners. The ongoing business, however,
may be worth more to either partner than it would be to an outsider, especially one who must be located quickly. Similarly, the
ongoing business may be worth more than the sum of the halves,
or the assets may be indivisible. 69 Indeed, in such circumstances, a
court might threaten a sale or dissolution in order to encourage
17 0

resolution of the problem by the partners themselves.

As an obvious but elegant solution to the partners' problem, Z
167 See, e.g., Birk, Shareholders' Appraisal Process: Need For Reform, 51 N.Y. St. B.J. 274
(1979); Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J.
Corp. L. 63 (1978); Buxbaum, The Dissenter's Appraisal Remedy, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1229
(1976); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 Yale
L.J. 223 (1962); Schreier & Joy, Judicial Valuation of "Close" Corporation Stock: Alice in
Wonderland Revisited, 31 Okla. L. Rev. 853 (1978).
1" For example, in a "buy-sell" agreement, a partner will value his own interest as part of
a plan to provide for dissolution, retirement, or death. Sometimes these are "crosspurchase" agreements which require each owner to buy the other owner's share at a mutually agreed price. This latter arrangement resembles the one developed in the text. This is
especially true if the owners are of similar age so that at the time of self-assessment it is
unclear whether a purchase or sale by the self-assessor's estate is the more likely contingency. Note that if a cross-purchase agreement is triggered by death, a self-assessor might
opt for a low valuation and purchase life insurance for his survivors' benefit. Note finally
the resemblance to self-assessment for property taxes in that the buy-sell amount may be
used for estate tax valuation. See generally A. Guild, Stock Purchase Agreements & The
Close Corporation 29-36 (1967); Costantino & Morlitz, Buy-Sell Agreements: A Basic Review, 13 Prac. Acct. 31, 32 (Oct. 1980).
16, For a discussion of "going concern" value, see V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, supra note
164, at 3-35.
170 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 165, at 26-30.
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may suggest that A announce his internal valuation of half the
company. Z would agree in advance either to buy out A at that
price or to force A to buy Z's share at that price. Although there
are drawbacks to this plan, it is probably far superior to hiring an
institutional appraiser whose knowledge of the prospects and intricacies of the business cannot possibly match Z's or A's. Accuracy
aside, Z's suggestion saves administrative costs because, unlike an
outside appraiser, Z and A need not familiarize themselves with
the business. 171 In short, this solution is no more than a simple
self-assessment plan. Much like the systems discussed earlier, this
scheme would improve accuracy and reduce administrative costs
by putting the valuation task in the hands of a party who is both
intimately familiar with the property or interest involved and constrained from overassessing.
Still, A might object to Z's suggestion and prefer that Z be the
initial assessor. A then could choose between buying out Z's half or
selling off his own. There is, after all, an advantage inherent in the
power to choose, and each party may prefer that the other be the
one to reveal internal tastes first. Although it may be "fair" to
meet A's objection by randomly selecting either A or Z as the initial assessor, introducing randomness does not solve the inequality
of the division that is the heart of A's objection. Simply stated,
randomness generates fair expected outcomes, but because there
will be a single trial or event, one party is worse off. Consider, for
example, the fairness of randomly awarding the entire business to
A or Z on the basis of a coin flip.
Conceptually, A's objection-which can be characterized as the
"disadvantage of the first assessor" when choice by another party
is to follow-is much like the objection that can be expected from
the typical property owner under a simple system of self-assessed
property tax valuations. It is easier to respond to another's valuation by becoming a "forcing buyer" or by simply ignoring the property's availability than it is to price one's own property and then
17, The hired appraiser may also be biased or may value risks in a manner quite different
from the way either partner would. Note that the appraiser conceivably could be paid in a
way that draws on the self-assessment principle. For example, an appraiser who values a
corporate share at $100, and is to be paid a fee of $300, could be paid with three shares or
forced to buy three shares. Apart from the fact that this scheme generates high transacting
costs, it is impractical because it would often have substantial effects on voting coalitions
and appraiser behavior.

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 839 1982

840

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 68:771

wait for a higher tax bill or a forcing buyer to arrive." 2
The concept of idiosyncratic tastes 17 3 and the objection to their
inclusion in the property tax base are related to the disadvantage
of the first assessor. Imagine that A enjoys his line of work and
would find it difficult and costly to begin such a business in another location. Although most people would value the "A-Z business" at $100,000 and, therefore, A's share at $50,000, A values his
own share at $70,000 because he assigns a $20,000 value to his idiosyncratic tastes. By suggesting that A be the first assessor, Z is
really charging A for his tastes. If A announces a value of just less
than $70,000, Z may choose to sell his own half to A, who must buy
under the terms of the arrangement. This arrangement forces A to
pay an "extra" $20,000 for something he already has. In other
words, A may get little more pleasure from owning the entire business than from owning only half of it. If A likes the prestige or
location of his half ownership, under the simple self-assessment
suggestion he must risk parting with his ownership at less than its
internal value, or pay for it "twice" if Z forces him to buy the entire business. This latter alternative may leave A with more of the
business than he has use for.174

171

The argument might also be expressed in terms of the burden of transacting costs.

The first assessor must always proceed with the self-assessment task, while the chooser can
normally wait to see if a challenging first assessor, i.e., a forcing buyer, materializes. Even
after a forcing buyer makes a threat, the owner need only decide whether his internal valuation is greater or less than the value announced by the first assessor. It is less trouble, after
all, to decide whether an asset is worth more or less than a stated value, than it is to determine the precise value of that asset.
In the case of a dissolving partnership or close corporation, only the latter burden is material. A sale is inevitable, so that both the first assessor and the chooser must undertake their
respective assessments. The first assessor nonetheless bears the burden of announcing a dollar valuation while the chooser may be saved much hard work and expense by a first assessment that is far enough from his own general valuation to save him the task of valuing small
considerations.
173 See supra note 39 and text accompanying notes 34-36.
174 The analysis reaches a similar result if the assumptions are reversed and A is assumed
to have increasing marginal utility for shares in the enterprise. That is, A may enjoy the
prestige of being a sole owner and therefore may value his share at $55,000 and the second
half of the business at $65,000. (If A values the total firm at less than $120,000, he may be
satisfied with a sale to an outsider.). If A is the first assessor, he will announce a value of
$60,000 because he is willing to sell at $55,000 and buy at $65,000. He will now enjoy a
$5,000 "delight." For example, if Z accepts the offer, A will receive $60,000 for a share he
was willing to sell for $55,000. If Z had been cast in the role of first assessor, however, A
would be even better off. If Z announces any valuation other than $60,000, then A will gain
even more than a $5,000 delight. If, for example, Z announces a $62,000 valuation, A will
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Similarly, the self-assessing homeowner may have an idiosyncratically strong distaste for moving. The simple self-assessment
system requires this homeowner to pay for his tastes each year in
the form of higher property taxes. If he undervalues his distaste
for moving, he risks a forced sale that will leave him undercompensated. Competitive assessment would be an improvement from the
perspective of the idiosyncratic homeowner precisely because it
does not require the owner to be the first assessor. Often, no assessor will challenge the real limit of the owner's tastes, and the
choice between somewhat higher property taxes and a forced sale
will be an easy one. Finally, a competitive-assessment system that
borrows from the concept of the second-price auction 1 "5 is even
more accommodating to the idiosyncratic property owner because
it allows him to choose in a way that is harshest to the first as°sessor. Recall that the first assessor can be forced to buy the property at the price he announces. Yet he is only rewarded, and the
property owner only taxed, based on the valuation of the secondhighest assessor. The first assessor in this system gets no sympathy, however, because he is a volunteer commission-hunter.
Returning to the partnership example, note that A's objection to
being the first assessor does not mean that he would prefer the
work to be done by a paid appraiser. Rather, A is comparing the
plan to one in which Z would assume the role of first assessor and
A would have the relative advantage of choosing by going second.
It is reasonable to assume that both A and Z would prefer to avoid
the transacting costs involved in hiring and educating an outside
appraiser. Furthermore, although there are disadvantages to being
first assessor, Z may be similarly displeased with the result of the
split even though he goes second. He, too, may have to pay "twice"
for something, because A may announce a value that would undercompensate Z. Yet, if Z buys out A at this price, Z may be paying some premium for the second half of the company, although it
is the first half that really appeals to him at a level above market
value.
The real objection to being first assessor is not, therefore, the
possibility of having to pay for an unwanted asset. This is a result
of the inability to get an outsider to value the company as highly
agree to sell the share that he willingly would have sold for $55,000.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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as A and Z do and not a feature of the order of assessment. Instead, the first assessor's true objection is to the expected magnitude of the payment. For example, imagine that the market value
is still $50,000 for one half of the business and A's internal valuation is $70,000 for his own share, but only $130,000 for the entire
business because, as before, the first half is worth more to him
than the second half. Thus, A would be willing to sell his share for
$70,000 or buy Z's for $60,000. A cannot benefit if, instead of
choosing, he must assess. As first assessor, A might compromise
with himself, in risk-neutral fashion, and announce a valuation of
$65,000. Whether Z decides to buy or sell, A will "lose" $5,000 in
the sense that he will be that much worse off than before the split.
If Z were the first assessor, however, A might emerge from the split
in somewhat better fashion. If Z announces a valuation of $65,000,
then, of course, A is no better or worse off. If he buys Z's share or
sells his own at that price, he is disappointed to the extent of
$5,000. If, however, Z's own tastes or strategy lead Z to announce
any other valuation, A's lot will improve. If, for example, Z announces a value of $68,000, A will sell his own share and suffer a
$2,000 disappointment. A will not buy Z's share because he only
values the second half at $60,000. An announced valuation by Z
above or below A's two valuations produces real relief for A and
points more decidedly to the disadvantage of the first assessor. For
example, if Z announces a valuation of $72,000, A will gladly sell
his own share and be better off than he could possibly have been
after any nonrisky first assessment of his own. In short, it is disadvantageous to reveal one's preferences when another party has the
subsequent right to choose.
This refined explanation of the first assessor's disadvantage does
not change the analogous disadvantage to the homeowner in a system of self-assessed property taxes. The property owner does not
compete with a partner but with society at large, because in property tax valuations the government and the owner are dividing up
an asset. All owners cannot be disadvantaged, because the government merely alters the tax rate in order to collect the revenues it
needs. It is the property owner's relative tax burden that is at
stake in the choice of an assessment system. In the simple selfassessment system, the idiosyncratic owner is disadvantaged because he must reveal his tastes before all the other individual assessors choose to buy. Competitive assessment removes this objec-
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tion. It disadvantages the idiosyncratic owner only to the extent
that a volunteer responds to the reward system and puts himself in
the position of first assessor. When the volunteer announces a
value that is above the nonidiosyncratic market value, yet below
the owner's own internal value, the owner's objection is to any tax
on value that would not be recognized by an institutional assessor.
This remaining disadvantage to the idiosyncratic owner who is not
the first assessor corresponds to A's disappointment, in the previous partnership example, when Z is the first assessor and announces a price that is higher than A's valuation of the second
half, but lower than A's valuation of the first half of ownership.
These objections to self-assessed and competitively assessed
property taxes and to the use of self-assessment in the splitting of
a partnership are thus analogous. The idiosyncratic owner and the
first assessor are disturbed by the realization that their relative
burdens might have been lightened by the use of a different process. Yet both may be better off than under a regime of institutional assessment because transacting costs are avoided. Indeed,
even they may prefer the improved accuracy of self-assessments as
compared with institutional assessments, despite their relatively
disadvantaged positions within the respective self-assessment
systems.
In contrast to the property tax and partnership dissolution contexts, an attractive feature of the proposed system for self-assessed
compensation in tort law is the absence of any disadvantage to the
first assessor. In self-assessed tort damages, no party is relatively
disadvantaged because no choice follows the revelation of tastes
and preferences. The only conceivable relative disadvantage befalls
the individual whose self-assessed needs are above the statutory
amount, but who would honestly prefer not to carry first-party insurance. If this preference is more important than the system's effect on administrative costs, then the proposed system is undesirable to this individual in an absolute sense as well. Nonetheless,
such individuals must surely be rare.
B.

Stock Valuation in Corporate Freezeouts

Arguably, the numerous complications that attended Z's suggested approach to dividing the partnership could have been
avoided by a system that required no ordering of decisionmaking
and thus no relative disadvantages. For example, a third person
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could call out increasingly larger dollar amounts and instruct A
and Z, who would be out of each other's sight, to signal as soon as
the third party had reached an acceptable sale price. The party
that signalled first would force a sale on the silent partner. Thus,
on the facts described earlier, as the caller reached $65,000, A
would signal his willingness to sell and Z would be required to
purchase A's share at that price. There is no need to compare in
any detail the properties of this scheme with those of Z's first suggestion, but it is clear that neither A nor Z is asked to reveal tastes
before the other, and, therefore, the relative disadvantage of the
first assessor is eliminated. The beauty of this "simultaneous assessment" system is that it is easily applicable to divisions among
three or more partners. The caller can begin with a very large
number and work his way down. A partner is to signal as soon as
he is willing to buy out all the other partners at that price per
share.
To prevent confusion while developing principles relevant to the
other arenas of self-assessment and to more complex corporate
stock sales, the discussion in the previous section did not raise this
possibility of "simultaneous assessment." Simultaneous assessment
works well in the partnership illustration only because of the reciprocal nature of the parties' relationships; in such a context, the
parties are able and willing to buy each other out, at least at some
reasonable price. In fact, the discussion up to this point implicitly
has assumed that neither A's nor Z's valuation was affected by a
budget constraint. Often, however, this will be a real problem. A
may be pleased to buy Z's share for $65,000, but Z may be unhappy buying A's share for more than some small amount of
money. Z's portfolio, wealth, and risk attitude may be such that he
cannot afford to own a larger piece of the enterprise. Simultaneous
assessment now places Z in the same disadvantaged position as the
first assessor. Under simultaneous assessment, he is forced early on
to reveal his distaste for purchasing A's share.
Similarly, the simultaneous assessment principle lacks utility in
the contexts of tort damages and property tax burdens because the
disadvantage of the first assessor is not a problem in either of
these two areas. The proposed tort compensation system does not
call for a chooser to act after the self-assessment because the selfassessor is the first and only assessor. In the property tax arena,
competitive assessment meets the first assessor's objection by al-
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lowing the property owner to be the chooser. There the first assessor is the outside volunteer. Although this latter scheme may
fail to take idiosyncratic tastes sufficiently into account in the tax
base, recall that the system was designed to be an acceptable alternative to conventional assessment in which idiosyncratic tastes are
not included at all.
There remains the task of designing a stock valuation system for
a shareholder who may be unwilling to purchase the shares of all of
his fellow shareholders. Normally, the marketplace itself, however
thin, 17 6 offers such a system. When a shareholder, B, purchases
stock in a corporation, T, the corporation rarely guarantees B an
assured market should he decide to sell his shares. Instead, B is
relegated to the marketplace, as are the owners of most goods in
our economic system. Thus, B is normally able to sell his shares at
market price, although he may be unwilling to buy more shares at
that price. It is conceivable that the managers of T owe a fiduciary
duty to B that would prevent them from undermining the market
for the corporation's shares. In other words, B may expect T's
managers not to make shares of T less marketable than they were
when he first purchased them.1 71 The nature of this expectation
depends on the law of fiduciary duty and thus remains outside the
scope of the present article.
There are nonetheless some transactions in which the market
disappears entirely. If the corporation is dissolved or sold in its
entirety to an outsider, the corporation's charter or bylaws, or the
state corporation law, provides for B's compensation. Each shareholder normally receives a pro rata share of the assets or sale proceeds.118 The situation is then as simple as the division of the A-Z

176 The thinner, or less active, the market for a particular company's stock, the more
ambiguous become the concepts of "value" and "market price." See supra note 17 and text
accompanying notes 14-17. Still, if an owner had been aware of the market's thinness when
purchasing his shares, he may have believed that the existing market valuation system was
adequate.
177 Arguably, such an action would be the equivalent of eliminating dividends in an effort
to suppress the market price. For a case that may have centered on the disadvantages of a
thin market, see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969).
178 Although most statutes do not explicitly require a pro rata division of assets or equal
treatment of shareholders, such a requirement follows from the common law's fiduciary
standard and can be inferred from the working of various statutes. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann.
tit. 8, § 281 (1979); Model Business Corp. Act § 92 (1969).
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business when an outsider is willing to pay an amount equal to the
value placed on the business by A and Z.11" On the other hand, T
corporation may go through an organic change-accompanied by
the disappearance of the market for its stock-that is not followed
by pro rata distributions of cash or assets. 180 Each shareholder of T
may then be entitled to an appraisal proceeding 81 as a substitute
for the now defunct market. 182 As part of certain of these organic
changes, B may be forced to abandon his shareholder status and
accept a specified amount of cash in return for his stock. Some of
these organic changes have been regarded as altogether objectionable.1"' Others, however, are generally accepted as socially beneficial,184 much like eminent domain, but the method of determining
179 If

A and Z are satisfied with an outsider's offer, they can easily accept the offer and
divide the proceeds in pro rata fashion.
18' In other words, it is reasonably simple to divide the proceeds of a dissolution or sale of
assets among the shareholders on a pro rata basis. Other structural changes, however, do not
yield easily distributable proceeds. For example, after a merger with S, T may continue to
exist in a form quite different from its premerger state; the new S-T stock may have marketability characteristics quite different from those of the old T stock.
181 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,§ 262 (1979); Model Business Corp. Act § 81 (1969).
An appraisal proceeding is a process through which the "fair value" or "fair market value"
of a stock is determined so that a shareholder may require the corporation to buy his shares
at this "value" when he dissents from certain structural changes. M. Eisenberg, The Structure Of The Corporation-A Legal Analysis 69 (1976). In order to compute this value, most
courts rely on some combination of net asset value, market value, and capitalized earnings.
See, e.g., Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979).
See generally Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L.
Rev. 1453 (1966).
' Manning, supra note 167, at 261 ("Appraisal should be considered an economic substitute for the stock exchange and its use should be limited to situations in which the exchange, or some kind of a reasonable market, is not available.").
18" The objections arise from the perception that these maneuvers create potential for
self-dealing by insiders, while lacking substantial business justification. In a "going private"
transaction, for example, controlling shareholders terminate public stock ownership and return the corporation to the status of a close corporation. As insiders may have hidden reasons to be optimistic about the firm's future, "going private" may merely be a way for them
to deny the current public ownership the benefits of these projected future gains. For the
classic condemnation of these transactions, see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of
Corporate Freezeouts, 87 Yale L.J. 1354, 1365-70 (1978).
18 In an "integrated" or "two-step" merger, an outside acquirer becomes the sole owner
of the acquired corporation. This acquirer may be unwilling to settle for less than total
control and, therefore, a ban on freezeouts or on other techniques by which shareholders can
be forced out could stifle desirable acquisitions and the improvements they bring. Thus, the
social good that derives from allowing freezeouts might be thought to overcome the distaste
for forced sales. Id. at 1359-65.
There is also a powerful argument for allowing these forced sales or structural changes in
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the amount of B's compensation is a much debated topic.1 85 Since
it is this compensation question that is the subject of this article
the discussion now turns to a specific example in which the need
for an appraisal remedy would arise.
Consider the events that occur when conglomerate corporation C
seeks to acquire target corporation T. The managers of C and T
might negotiate and agree on a sale of assets by T to C. Often, if
such a sale agreement is reached, no shareholder of T (such as B)
would be able to object to the result.1 86 A shareholder vote might
be necessary, but a "dissenter" would normally be powerless to do
1 87
anything other than accept his pro rata share of the proceeds.
Conceptually, such a result can be rationalized by noting that B
was represented by T's managers and there is every reason to expect that these managers negotiated as good a deal as possible for
T as a whole and, therefore, for each T shareholder. If B cannot
dissent from the ongoing business decisions of T, then why should
he be able to upset a decision to sell assets?
Yet imagine that these negotiations between T and C have fallen
through. C now announces its willingness to deal directly with T's
shareholders and to purchase any and all T shares at twenty dollars per share. T shares have been selling at a price near sixteen

the context of a merger between a parent and its subsidiary. (Of course, if the subsidiary is a
new one, the parent is really completing the second step of an integrated merger and the
previous discussion applies.) There may be scale economies to a combination of the two
entities. Moreover, future fiduciary problems can be avoided by combining the parent and
its partially owned subsidiary into one unit. The terms of this merger must be judged for
fairness because the managers of the subsidiary can hardly be expected to bargain vigorously in setting the terms of the merger. A "proportionate sharing" rule has been proposed
for such mergers. Under such a rule, the subsidiary's shareholders would be compensated
(normally with shares in the new combined entity) for the value of the premerger subsidiary
plus a proportionate share of the "synergy," or added value, created by the corporate combination. Id. at 1370-76. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
185 See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 297 (1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 183; Lorne, A Reappraisal of Fair
Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1978); Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 548 (1978).
"' Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271 (1979) (requiring a majority vote of the outstanding stock to approve a decision by the board of directors to sell all the corporation's assets,
but not providing an appraisal remedy to dissenting shareholders) with Model Business
Corp. Act §§ 78-80 (1969) (reserving the power to dissent when assets are sold other than
"in the regular course of business").
18' See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963).
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dollars. Most of T's shareholders are thrilled by the prospect of
this tender offer premium and so sell their shares to C. Assume
that ninety-two percent of T's shareholders follow this path. B and
188
a few others do not tender.
Buoyed by its success and eager to own all of T, C now wishes to
purchase the remaining shares outside its control. The law is inclined to allow a forced sale or "freezeout" of the dissenting shareholders, as it probably should.18 9 C may have a new plan for T's
business and it does not wish to share the resulting profits with B
and other surviving shareholders. If C is limited to ninety-two percent of the value of its good plan, it may, in the future, invest its
resources elsewhere so that its own rate of return will be maximized, even though, from society's perspective, investment in T offers a higher rate of return. Put somewhat differently, if C is
forced to share the value of its plans with B, C may needlessly
gather assets and set up a competitor to T. This would drive T out
of business and its assets into disuse, when efficiency would be
better served by C's utilizing T's assets. Thus, B and his codissenters may well hold out and seek to exploit their situational monopoly at the expense of society.19 0

I" Note that a small shareholder (much like a voter in a presidential election) may realize
that he is most unlikely to affect the outcome of the tender offer and therefore may refuse
the offer and hope to share, or free ride, in the profits that result from the acquirer's better
idea. On the strength of this theory, it has been suggested that the corporate charter attempt to exclude nontendering shareholders from posttakeover profits. See Grossman &
Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J.
Econ. 42 (1980). A full discussion of the impracticality of this solution is beyond the scope
of the present article, but it is important to realize that many reasons exist for refusing to
tender. See infra notes 194-97, 199-201 and accompanying text.
"'
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1979) (90% ownership requirement); Model
Business Corp. Act. § 75 (1969) (allowing a parent and its 90% owned subsidiary to merge
by action of the board of directors without the approval of either corporation's
shareholders).
190 The dissenter triggers a classic showdown between property rights and socially desirable projects. Although it requires "just compensation," the law permits the government to
emerge victorious from such a confrontation without offering similar power to private parties who might like to take from others and turn over the "fair value" of what has been
taken. In markets other than the stock market, an acquirer, such as a real estate developer
or mining company, may be able to do without this power of the forcing buyer because the
seller may be unaware of the acquirer's intentions or "better idea." In fact, the acquirer may
employ an intermediary to effect the purchase in a way that will not arouse the seller's
suspicions. Legislation affecting the securities market, however, denies the acquirer these
opportunities. To ensure that shareholders are treated alike and perhaps to protect the
reigning managers from "pirates," the Williams Act requires an acquirer to reveal its inten-
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In any event, assume that C forces out the remaining T share' or other legal technique
holders by using a "short-form merger,"' 1 91
designed to facilitate C's business activity and counteract the
power of holdouts. What compensation -should B receive? In short,
what is the "right price" for the second step of a two-step
acquisition?
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have suggested that the

freezeout price should be identical to the tender price, in this case,
twenty dollars. 92 Presumably, any higher price would encourage
shareholders not to tender in the first step of the acquisition, and
C's new idea might be lost because of this gaming by shareholders.
On the other hand, a lower price would create a "whipsaw" effect,
in which risk-averse shareholders would tender their shares at a
price less than their internal valuations out of the fear that the
tender offer would be successful and the freezeout price leave them
in a still worse position.1 93 Moreover, matching the twenty-dollar
tender price recreates, in a sense, the pro rata result that would
have occurred had the management of T been able to negotiate a
sale of assets to C.
An alternative to the "equal payments" solution of Brudney and
Chirelstein is to take more seriously the "intrinsic value" of the
shares to those shareholders who have been frozen out. Commentators have suggested that an appraiser should determine the price
to be paid in this second step using not only traditional valuation

tions once it owns five percent of a registered company's stock and before it makes a tender
offer. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 & Supp.
HI 1979) (as amended by Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) and
subsequent amendments (1970, 1977)). Although this might appear to allow market
purchases by the acquirer or its agent to proceed without any disclosure, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and some courts have considered some market transactions to be
tender offers. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, supra note 165, at 1571-73. Of course, there
would be less of a need for freezeouts if securities legislation did not require the disclosure
that it does. Without such disclosure, bargaining would be untainted and it would be easier
to conclude that an obstinate seller really assigned a high internal value to his shares and
was not a holdout trying to extract an unfair share of the acquirer's better idea.
191Short-form mergers obviate the need for shareholder voting. See supra note 189. See
generally Note, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 596 (1965).
192 Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 297, 336-40 (1974). The discussion in the text ignores the difficulties that arise if other
events significantly affect the price of Ts stock in the post-tender but pre-freezeout period.
If such events occur, some intrinsic valuation will be necessary or interest will need to be
awarded on the stock held in the interim.
193

Id. at 337.
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data about the companies themselves but also information that is
shareholder-specific.194 After all, B may have refused C's tender offer not only because B's prediction of T's future is optimistic 95 but
also, for example, because B may have a low basis in these T
shares and be in a high marginal tax bracket. 196 The appraiser
would calculate B's compensation to include B's tax liabilities and
the cost of reinvesting in similar enterprises. Presumably, this appraisal could be done either by adding appropriate amounts to the
tender price or by starting from scratch and appraising the value
of T, the value of any "synergy" created by the joinder of C and T
(to be divided between C and T),19 7 and the need for shareholder-

specific compensation.
Neither of these proposals is necessarily fair or economically efficient. The successful tender offer price is not so much a recreated
I" Elfin, Changing Standards and the Future Course of Freezeout Mergers, 5 J. Corp. L.
261, 272-73 (1980); Toms, supra note 185, at 575-85.
15 The market price reflects only the marginal market transaction. Inframarginal purchasers are likely to have bought the share at a price below that which they would have
been willing to pay. This differential has been referred to as the "consumer surplus." See
supra note 35. When the good in question is a share of corporate stock, one may presume
that any consumer surplus derives from the purchaser's relatively optimistic forecast about
the investment return for the given risk that is available from this share. For an explanation
of why the purchaser's optimism does not lead him to buy an infinite number of shares in
this investment, see infra note 199.
196 See Toms, supra note 185, at 569-70. The two causes of "honest dissent" that are
offered in the text are quite independent of one another. Even if the individual demands for
investments are such that it is difficult to imagine some shareholders with a small stake in a
corporate enterprise honestly insisting on their excessive optimism for the firm's future, the
different tax circumstances among shareholders provide an adequate explanation for "honest dissent."
191 Although Toms appears to agree with the Brudney-Chirelstein proposal to allocate a
fair share of synergistic gains to the subsidiary's shareholders, he breaks with Brudney and
Chirelstein over the proper treatment of dissenters to the second step of an integrated
merger. Brudney and Chirelstein, apparently sympathetic to the need for incentives in the
acquisitions market, would not force an outsider to share its "better idea" under the terms
of the second step of its takeover. To be sure, the dissenters to whom Toms would give
valuation rights ought to get some synergy in the sense that their corporation may have
been desirable to other acquirers. This potential to attract a premium in a merger or sale of
assets is itself a valuable asset that belongs entirely to the target. This asset, however, is not
one that requires the particular "better idea" conceived by C, the actual acquirer. Its value
was already reflected jn the market price of T's stock. In sum, although Toms would proceed with a "fair shares" division of the synergy, allocated according to the pre-merger intrinsic values of the two companies, a better approach preserves the incentives for an
outside acquirer. The intrinsic valuation therefore should include synergistic gains only to
the extent that these could have been expected before the acquirer arrived.
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bargain as it is the result of a variety of psychological factors. T's
shareholders respond to C's offer based on their judgment of
whether C will come forward with a still better offer, whether some
other offeror will appear, and their own tax circumstances. 1"s
Therefore, this price-and matching it in the second step-is less
related to the price needed to stimulate desirable acquisitions than
first might have appeared. The alternative proposal that calls for a
second-step appraisal, including compensation for tax liabilities
and other shareholder-specific concerns, however, also does little to
ensure an efficient acquisitions market. Shareholders who might
have been inclined to tender in the first step may hold back and
hope for tax compensation in a freezeout. Desirable takeovers may
be stalled because an insufficient number of shareholders will initially accept the tender offer. Moreover, any such appraisal entails
administrative costs and is likely to be highly speculative and
inaccurate.
If self-assessment is to be of any use in the takeover and freezeout tangles, then it must overcome B's obvious interest in insisting
on a very high valuation. Note that B's claim of an internal value
greater than the market value of sixteen dollars is plausible. This
market value only reveals that B did not want to buy any more
shares at this price, perhaps because of his taste for a diversified
portfolio. B's demand for shares of T corporation may well be like
most demand curves and exhibit diminishing marginal utility for
each additional share purchased.1 9 9 The average value to B of the
198

This ignores the possibility that a tender offer will be rejected by a shareholder who

seeks a free ride on postmerger synergy. See supra note 188.
199 See supra note 195. The "optimism" argument is complete if B can offer some rationale for his not purchasing increasing amounts of T's stock to match his optimism about T's
future. The concept of diminishing marginal utility provides such a rationale. See P. Samuelson, Economics 408-09 (11th ed. 1980).
Imagine a world in which stores are closed or out of stock and B finds himself shirtless.
One seller materializes and offers to sell one shirt. B may well pay $300 for a shirt that
would normally sell for $15, for B does not relish the idea of appearing for work half-naked.
The seller then offers a second shirt. We can expect B to pay somewhat less than $300,
because his concern is now one of frequent laundering rather than nakedness. Similarly,
third and fourth shirts will sell for still less. B's demand curve for shirts thus slopes downward and exhibits diminishing marginal utility. Assume that after acquiring a tenth shirt for
$14, B would only pay $12 for an eleventh shirt. The "market price" may appear to be $14,
but it would hardly be fair or efficient to allow a stranger to take away all 10 of B's shirts
for $140.
Shares of T, like these shirts, are unavailable in the market. Furthermore, B's attitude
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shares already owned is almost certainly more than sixteen dollars.20 0 The law does not allow one party to take the property of
another and leave a sum of money equal to its prevailing market
price.2 0 1 This ought to be especially true where it is impossible to
replicate the item taken. This is B's position because it obviously is
impossible for him to replenish his stock in T corporation.2 °2
In sum, this difficult valuation problem is complicated by the
desire to see efficient takeover bids succeed so that "better ideas"
for the management of T can be implemented. This problem is a
search for a sensible middle ground between disallowing any forced
sale, even at a price much higher than the prevailing market price,
and allowing holdouts to interfere with socially desirable acquisitions. A self-assessment solution must draw on the strength of the
proposed system for tort compensation and insist on self-assessment before the obligation to compensate is triggered. Self-assessed tort damages were thought to be accurate because the proposed system required first-party insurance coverage to be
purchased before any accident or liability determination took
place. In fact, when purchasing such insurance, the self-assessor is
likely to know that the probability of recovery from a tortfeasor is
much lower than the probability of recovery from an insurer. Insurers will often pay out on policies with no prospect of subrogation. Insurance premiums will reflect this fact and discourage
overassessment.

toward risk is likely to affect his taste for shares of T much as a growing wardrobe affected
his willingness to buy more shirts. If B were to purchase more and more shares of T, his
portfolio would become increasingly less diversified. Thus, it is reasonable for B to insist
that he values his shares, on average, in excess of the market price-but that risk considerations constrain him from making further purchases of T stock.
200 See supra note 199. Only an extremely elastic demand curve would cause B to value all
his shares at or near market price. Elasticity refers to the responsiveness of quantity demanded to price changes. Such elasticity or "flatness" of B's demand curve could derive
from unusual indifference to increased risk or substantial enough wealth in other investments so that additional shares of T barely affect the riskiness of B's overall portfolio.
201 For a discussion of how property rights serve the economic function of developing
incentives to utilize resources in a socially efficient manner, see R. Posner, supra note 57,
§ 3.1.
202 There is an obvious analogy between freezeouts and forced sales in the context of the
self-assessment system for property tax valuation. The reader who disapproved of the latter-because of the forced sales that were adopted in order to guard against underassessment-ought to be quite sympathetic to the frozen-out shareholder whom this self-assessment system for corporate mergers seeks to protect.
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A similar system of prior self-assessment might be feasible in the
securities area. After the offeror-conglomerate C announces that it
will proceed with a tender offer for the shares of the target corporation T, but before C announces its tender price, the system could
conceivably require all stockowners of T to submit sealed envelopes containing internal valuations of their shares. In the event
that T's shareholders are frozen out within a reasonably short period, these self-assessed valuations would determine their proper
compensation. Thus, if B is in a particularly vulnerable tax bracket, he can add the additional tax liability into his self-assessed
amount. The system needs to include a device-like forced sales
for property taxes and insurance premiums for tort damages-that
guards against overassessment. One possibility recognizes that the
acquirer C may be satisfied with the share of ownership that it
acquires during the takeover's first step, the tender offer. After all,
not all tender offers are followed by freezeouts. Self-assessing
shareholders would not be permitted to be inconsistent in their behavior. For example, if B self-assesses at twenty-two dollars and
C's tender offer is then at twenty dollars, B would be unable to
tender his shares and accept the twenty dollar price, which includes the substantial premium above recent market value. If C's
tender offer is nevertheless successful and then C does proceed to
freeze out the minority shareholders, B would receive twenty-two
dollars for each of his shares.
The internal valuations gathered in preparation for a freezeout
can be put to an interesting and different use. Some commentators
have argued that the law tends to discourage desirable corporate
acquisitions and that takeovers ought to serve as a check on entrenched management. -3 In fact, the very idea of trying to satisfy
the internal valuations of dissenting shareholders, however honest,
would probably be abhorrent to such writers who already argue
that desirable takeovers are stymied by transacting costs and legal
obstacles.2 0 4 Self-assessment and the submission of internal valuations, however, can actually make C's takeover less expensive. If C
is interested in purchasing a controlling interest in T, the shareholders' self-assessments could be totalled and C informed of the

103

See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-

sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981).
20, Id. at 1174-75. See generally V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, supra note 164, at 716-20.
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amount necessary to satisfy-but not exceed-each and every internal valuation until the- desired ownership interest is acquired. C
could then choose this shareholder-by-shareholder acquisition
route over the tender offer or two-step pattern. 20 5 In a sense, this
system would substitute shareholder-by-shareholder bargaining2
for the sale-of-assets bargain that was never reached by the managers of C and T.
To see how this system can help the acquirer C, imagine that
eighty percent of T's shareholders are willing to sell at eighteen
dollars, twelve percent at twenty dollars, seven percent at thirty
dollars, and one percent at sixty dollars. A twenty dollar offer
would succeed in acquiring ninety-two percent of the outstanding
shares at a dollar cost of 1840x, where x represents one percent of
the total number of outstanding shares. A freezeout under the
Brudney-Chirelstein rule would cost another 160x,2 07 for a total acquisition cost of 2000x. If C is permitted to pay only the self-assessed amounts, ninety-two percent ownership can be acquired for
(80x x $18) + (12x x $20) = 1680x. The "freezeout" will cost an
additional (7x x $30) + (lx x $60) = 270x, for a total acquisition
cost of 1950x. Thus, in this example, the entire target company T
can be purchased at a lower cost, even if every shareholder's expectations are satisfied. Of course, not all examples will turn out this
way, but the point is that a self-assessment system that satisfies all
internal valuations is not necessarily more discouraging to acquirers than the more traditional system that forces some shareholders out at a price less than their internal valuations. Thus, the
internal value model actually may be more advantageous for acquirers than the pro rata model.
Some shareholders will be willing to gamble and self-assess at a
level far above that called for by their internal valuations. These
shareholders concede the loss of a premium if the acquirer only
goes through the first step of the acquisition or backs away from it
oI C should be required to pay some or all of the transacting costs required for this

scheme in order to discourage mildly-interested acquirers or accomplices of C from inspecting the sealed "bids" of all T's shareholders.
206 Such bargaining is not really recreated because each shareholder's first offer, itself
somewhat biased by the shareholder's expectations regarding the acquirer's behavior, is accepted. This first offer is likely to exceed the shareholder's reservation price.
201 Using the "equal payments rule," the freezeout price will be $20 and will be paid to
eight percent of the shareholders for a total of 160x.
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altogether. They take this risk in hope of a large profit in the event
of a freezeout. Put plainly, the system's guard against over-assessment may be too weak. It is possible to strengthen this guard by
placing an arbitrary limit on the premium that can be self-assessed. For example, any assessment that is more than forty percent '0 above the recent market price could be ignored. In the previous example, since the market price was sixteen dollars, no selfassessment above $22.40 would be honored. Under this system, after a twenty-dollar tender offer at a cost of 1840x, a freezeout
could be accomplished at 179.2x, for a total cost of 2018.2x.109 Alternatively, if the acquirer is permitted to bypass the tender offer
and purchase stock at each shareholder's internal valuation level,
then with the forty percent ceiling on self-assessed premiums the
entire target could be acquired for (80x x $18) + (12x x $20) +
(8x x $22.4) = 1859.2x.
The problem presented by gambling self-assessed shareholders
can also be solved by appealing to the familiar "forcing buyer."21 0
The tender offeror C would be allowed to purchase the minority
shares in the second step or freezeout stage of the acquisition at
the self-assessed prices or, perhaps, force the self-assessor to
purchase a certain number of shares, such as 100 shares or twentyfive percent of the number owned by the self-assessor, at the selfassessed price. Conceptually, this scheme permits the acquirer to
"doubt" the self-assessment and force a purchase of some shares
owned by the acquirer. Under this system, the sixty-dollar self assessors in the previous illustration could be forced by C to
purchase some shares at the sixty dollar price. Given that C may
0 The 40% limit is selected because it matches some of the higher estimates of tender
offer premiums. These studies reach different conclusions because, among other things, they
compare the tender offer prices to different pre-tender market prices. In the pre-tender
period, stock prices may have been bid up by insider trading, general market conditions,
and random events. For a summary of some of these studies, with estimates of premiums
that vary from 15% to 40%-or even 49% if the pre-tender period is extended to two
months-see Bradley, Interim Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, in Ecohomics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation 222, 228-29 (R. Posner & K. Scott eds.
1980). Some evidence indicates that the "arbitrary limit" in the text ought to be 50% or
higher. S. Lee & R. Colman, Handbook of Mergers, Acquisitons and Buyouts 18-19 (1981)
(calculating the average premium in 1979 for 229 acquisitions to be 49.9% compared with
46.2% for 240 transactions in 1978).
'" The freezeout step would involve eight percent of the shares and require a ceiling price
of $22.40 per share. $22.4 x 8x = 179.2x.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
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intend to carry out only the first step, this is a very real threat and
would discourage high self-assessments. It is conceivable that a
shareholder may be disadvantaged because he would prefer not to
sell at a given price but also not wish to buy any more shares at
that price.2 11 This feature is so similar to its counterpart in the
self-assessment system for property tax determination that it need
not be discussed any further.
It appears, then, that optimistic expectations and shareholderspecific concerns such as tax liabilities can be protected by a selfassessment system. Such a system is necessarily complex but does
avoid the unpleasant aspects of a freezeout. On the other hand, the
more this self-assessment system assists "desirable" acquisitions-in which the value of the target to the acquirer is greater
than the sum of the internal valuations of the target's shareholders-the more the self-assessors must be put in the disadvantaged
role of first assessor. One can use self-assessment, after all, only to
compensate the forced sellers in the second step of the acquisition.
All shareholders would be better off, so long as the acquirer goes
ahead with the acquisition, and no shareholder would be frozen out
at a price below his internal valuation. Acquisitions would become
more expensive, however, and perhaps overdeterred. In response to
this objection, the system might use self-assessment in lieu of the
first step of the acquisition and allow the acquirer to buy shares at
a price below the intended tender offer price. Some shareholders
will then be worse off because their shares would have been bought
at a price below that which they would have received in a tender
offer. Those shareholders who, in the earlier example, valued their
shares at eighteen dollars are disadvantaged by having to reveal
their tastes before the chooser decides on the nature and extent of
the acquisition.
A greater drawback to this self-assessment system is its use of
such a complicated mechanism to guard against overassessment,
that is, the requirement that the shareholders record their initial
self-assessments. Unless an acquirer is willing to assert that it will
not attempt a freezeout in the foreseeable future, every tender of211 See supra notes 195 & 199. The shareholder's portfolio and risk attitude may be such
that he does not want to increase his position in T's stock. It hardly would be fair in the
context of the property tax, for example, to force a self-assessor to buy another identical
home at a price equal to his self-assessment of his own home.
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fer would entail substantial transacting costs as shareholders
mailed in sealed self-assessments and the costs of alternative acquisitions were tallied. These costs must be multiplied when it is
recognized that the number of market transactions in the target
corporation's shares increases dramatically when a tender offer is
announced; new owners continually appear. Moreover, the system
must deal with shareholders who neglect to self-assess. There is no
longer a first-step price to match, and the concept of a "statutory
amount" is difficult to construct in this context. 212 The high transacting costs that are encountered in the quest for a self-assessed
freezeout derive from the system's requirement that all shareholders self-assess and report their valuations. 213 All of these self-as-

sessments will be wasted if no freezeout materializes, and most will
be wasted even if one does, because the majority necessarily will
have already accepted the terms of the tender offer. Even if the
acquirer is allowed to use the self-assessments as favorable
purchase prices, the self-assessments may be wasted in the sense
that a tender offer accomplishes much the same result with far less
effort.
By way of comparison, the self-assessment system for tort damages wastes fewer resources. Its reliance on first-party insurance
coverage is convenient because this insurance is itself useful, unlike
sealed envelopes, and would have been purchased by many people
even in the absence of a self-assessment system. Furthermore, a
great many potential victims will be more than satisfied with the
statutory amounts and will not resort to self-assessment by insurance with its associated transacting costs. Finally, accuracy aside,
the administrative and court costs that accompany the current system of damage determination are so compelling and so easily saved
212 The system could deal with neglectful shareholders by using a "statutory premium
percentage." See supra note 208. Thus, a nonassessing shareholder could be assumed to
have assessed at an amount equal to 140% of market price.
213 It is conceivable that this system be optional so that some shareholders self-assess
while others remain able to pursue traditional remedies. Transacting costs would be saved
because not every shareholder would need to fill out forms and send in sealed envelopes.
Any such choice, however, raises the risk of adverse selection. Shareholders who are particularly risk-seeking or interested in outguessing may opt for self-assessment, while particularly
litigious individuals may opt out and ready themselves for courtroom battles. Thus, the
worst of both systems may result. Sef-assessment would be inaccurate and transacting costs
would not be reduced. For a similar argument concerning optional self-assessment for tort
damages, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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by the proposed system that the cost of self-assessment is insignificant in comparison. The current system of appraising corporate
stock, inaccurate as it may be, does not appear to be nearly so expensive. The Brudney-Chirelstein rule is virtually cost-free in the
sense that, except perhaps for developments in the period between
the tender offer and the freezeout, the successful tender offer price
is simply matched.
The low transacting costs of the proposed system for allocating
the property tax burden are particularly striking. Each property is
institutionally appraised under the traditional system. The self-assessment system merely transfers this task both to people who are
more familiar with the property's characteristics and to volunteers,
thereby decreasing costs and improving accuracy. The analysis of
transacting-cost savings in the division of a business owned by a
small number of shareholders with no budget constraints is quite
similar. Again, the alternative to self-assessment by a knowledgeable party is to use an outside appraiser who must first learn about
the firm and its future prospects.
Self-assessed stock valuations in corporate freezeouts must be
made attractive for their accuracy if, as seems clear, their ability to
reduce transacting costs is unimpressive. Yet the system, as described, suffers somewhat from the same tendency toward inaccuracy-and therefore unreliable allocation of economic resources-as the Brudney-Chirelstein formulation requiring equal
payments to dissenting shareholders. In announcing the self-assessed valuation and responding to a tender offer, each shareholder
may be guessing the extent of his holdout power rather than assessing the internal value of his shares. Similarly, if self-assessment
were to be used only in the freezeout stage of an acquisition, the
system would suffer from the other problem discussed earlier:
shareholders of the target would not tender and instead hope for a
second step and a windfall payout of the amount they had "selfassessed."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Self-assessment is a powerful technique for determining the
value of a property or interest. In different contexts it can lower
the administrative costs of the legal system or increase the accuracy of valuations that are required-or both. The strengths and
weaknesses of a self-assessment system can be evaluated only after
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a particular system is designed carefully and then only by comparison to the characteristics of the conventional assessment system
that it would replace. Of the self-assessment systems analyzed in
this article, the one for tort compensation probably has the most
promise, while that for complex stock valuations probably has the
least. Self-assessment methods for property tax assessment can be
adapted to meet a variety of goals and objections, but would first
require a significant change in the common perception of what
ought to be included in the tax base.
The technique of system design in all these cases was to have the
individual most familiar with the possession or claim in question
participate, sometimes exclusively, in its assessment. The major
task, then, is to guard against a self-assessment that is more selfinterested than honest. This proved to be a formidable task in the
case of stock valuation because of a disinclination to force the selfassessor to purchase additional property at the self-assessed price.
The tort system requires such a purchase, but it is a purchase of
first-party insurance that can itself be useful and is not required of
every potential injured party. Because the property tax system
deals with a subject of continuing ownership rather than a taking
or injury, use can be made of the prospect of forced sales of the
property in question rather than forced purchases of additional
property.
Although the development of self-assessment systems is primarily motivated by the desire for valuation accuracy, the tort and
property tax systems proposed here are also able to effect substantial savings in administrative costs. The current court-administered assessment system for tort damages is particularly cumbersome and attempts to solve an almost hopelessly difficult problem
of valuation. As such, it is the most attractive candidate for selfassessment. Presumably, the system could begin on a volunteer basis with courts continuing to determine damages for injured parties
who had not previously elected to regard their insurance coverage
as self-assessment. Alternatively, courts could begin to rely on evidence of first-party insurance as a self-assessment device that
would be relevant in determining damages in an otherwise traditional trial.
Self-assessment is a simple concept already used, unwittingly
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perhaps, in a variety of contexts.2 14 This article has tried to explore
24 The oldest and most remarkable self-assessment system developed in the admiralty
rules of fifteenth and sixteenth century Northern Europe. When cargo was sacrificed at sea
to save the vessel, the loss was apportioned among the master of the vessel and all the
merchants with cargo on the vessel, according to the value of each of their interests. The
difficulty in valuing the vessels-given their uniqueness and the absence of relevant market
prices or valuation systems-was overcome by requiring each master to value his vessel
upon arrival and then giving the merchants the option of acquiring the vessel at the stated
price or using the self-assessed valuation for the contribution calculation. K. Selmer, The
Survival Of General Average 46 & n.29 (1958) (referring to Hamburg law at the close of the
fifteenth century and the Maritime Code of Fredrik 11 enacted in 1561).
Perhaps the most complete and time-honored self-assessment system is that used for balancing competition in horse racing. The great majority of thoroughbred races are "claiming
races" and allow the owner of any horse run at a given meeting to purchase any horse in the
claiming race at the announced price. For example, before the start of a $20,000 claiming
race, any owner may use the "claim box" and purchase a horse run in that race for $20,000.
Thus, an owner of a $20,000 horse will not enter his horse in a $10,000 claiming race in an
attempt to win an easy purse (offered to the winner of a race). Apparently, about one horse
a day (at a typical racetrack) changes ownership because of these "claims." J. Humphreys,
Racing Law 313 (1963). It is hardly surprising that the claim must be made before the race
starts. After all, self-assessment is attractive because an owner knows his horse's qualities
better (less expensively) than would any institutional assessor (handicapper). Yet the owner
obviously does not know the results of the day's claiming race before entering his horse in it.
Thus, the guard against underassessment must be exercisable only before the race is run.
The system is very much like the simple self-assessment system for property taxes. Although both systems contain a "disadvantage of the first assessor," this disadvantage is
somewhat offset in the claiming race by the requirement that each forcing buyer have himself entered a horse that meeting and thus suffered his own disadvantage as a first assessor.
Interestingly enough, horse racing rules appear to be sensitive to the problem posed by
idiosyncratic tastes. In "allowance races" the entering horses are not up for sale but are
assigned carrying weights based upon previous experience and victories. Similarly, in handicap races, the nominees are not for sale, but in these races weights are assigned by an institutional assessor-the racing secretary. Invariably, allowance races are for better horses
than are claiming races, and handicap races are for still better racehorses. For one thing, as
horses run more races and are noted for their excellence they attract more attention, and
the self-assessing owner does not have much more information than the institutional assessor. Furthermore, owners may be willing to enter their run-of-the-mill racehorses in
claiming races but less anxious to part with the most carefully bred and coddled horses.
These horses tug at the owner's idiosyncratic tastes, and the existence of allowance and
handicap races may well reflect the disinclination to monetize and risk these tastes. Finally,
as a practical matter there are very few top-notch horses in any one year, and a racing field
of excellent horses may be difficult to assemble under the rules of a claiming race. For
example, only one active horse in the country may be self-assessed at more than $1 million,
and if claiming races were the exclusive outlet this horse might never run a race. After all, in
a $1 million claiming race this horse's owner suffers the disadvantage of the first assessor,
but his competitors enter horses of much lesser value and so-while all owners and horses
try for the purse-only one owner really undertakes the disadvantage of the first assessor.
For the ground rules of the various types of races, see K. Phifer, Track Talk: An Introduction To Thoroughbred Horse Racing 57-65 (1978).
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its potentials and costs in several varying settings. The author
hopes that this article will encourage others to improve upon the
models suggested here, apply their principles to new areas, and reflect upon the often unnoticed characteristics of existing valuation
systems.
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